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SUSPECT LINKAGE: THE INTERPLAY OF 
STATE TAXING AND SPENDING MEASURES 
IN THE APPLICATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION RULES 
Dan T. Coenen* 
and Walter Hellerstein** 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines an important and recurring question that 
courts frequently resolve, but rarely analyze: whether taxing and 
spending measures should be viewed together when a state imposes 
a nondiscriminatory tax but also affords relief to some taxpayers 
through government spending. The answer to this question will 
often determine whether the state's actions violate constitutional 
strictures against discriminatory taxation. The taxing measure and 
the spending measure will generally pass muster if viewed in isola­
tion. After all, courts rarely invalidate nondiscriminatory taxing 
measures on constitutional grounds.1 And true government spend­
ing measures, if considered alone, plainly fall outside the reach of 
constitutional restraints against discriminatory taxation. On the 
other hand, when taxing and spending measures are viewed 
together, they raise profound problems. In particular, the two 
measures often operate to produce precisely the result that the con­
stitutional prohibitions against discriminatory taxation seek to 
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia; B.S. 1974, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1978, 
Cornell. - Ed. 
** Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1970, University of 
Chicago. - Ed. 
Tue authors would like to thank Amy L. Silverstein for her helpful comments on an ear­
lier draft of this article. 
1. To be sure, courts occasionally strike down state truces for lack of sufficient nexus, see, 
e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), or because they are not fairly appor­
tioned, see, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317 (1968), or 
because they fall directly on the federal government, see, e.g., United States v. Lohman, 74 
F.3d 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2549 (1996). But discrimination has been by far 
the most common basis for invalidation of state truces on constitutional grounds, especially in 
recent years. 
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avoid: the imposition of a greater burden in "practical effect"2 on a 
constitutionally protected class of state taxpayers. 
These questions arise in a wide variety of contexts. Invoking the 
Commerce Clause, taxpayers have attacked nondiscriminatory 
levies imposed on an industry when the state has made payments 
related to the tax or granted reductions in other taxes only to the 
extent that industry members engage in intrastate trade.3 Invoking 
the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, taxpayers have chal­
lenged nondiscriminatory exactions imposed on federal and state 
retirement income when the state simultaneously has awarded · 
increased pension benefits to state retirees.4 And invoking uni­
formity and equality provisions of state constitutions, taxpayers 
have attacked nondiscriminatory property taxes when the govern­
ment has granted credits against the tax that have produced 
nonuniform effective rates.s 
In each of these settings, the essential problem is the same: 
whether courts should view the state taxing and spending measures 
as an integrated whole or as independent components of the law for 
purposes of constitutional analysis. If the two measures are consid­
ered together, the entire scheme will violate the operative anti­
discrimination rule, because payments made to the favored group 
will produce the prohibited disparity in effective tax burdens. If, on 
the other hand, the court considers the two measures separately, 
they will emerge unscathed from the constitutional attack. 
In Parts I, II, and III of this article, we analyze cases that have 
raised these sorts of tax discrimination issues under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the intergovernmental-tax-immunity doctrine, 
and state uniformity and equality provisions. In Part IV, we step 
back from the cases and propose a systematic approach, applicable 
2. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). See generally infra 
section IV.A.1. 
3. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725 {1981); cf. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 304-05 (1987) 
{Scalia, J., dissenting) (considering linkage of simultaneous tax reforms; discussed infra notes 
161-66). 
4. See Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993); Ragsdale 
v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Or.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995). 
5. See Westvaco Corp. v. South Carolina Dept. of Revenue, 467 S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 1995) 
{per curiam); Baker v. Matheson, 607 P .2d 233 {Utah 1979); State ex rel. La Follette v. 
Torphy, 270 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1978). The problem of unlawful linkage between taxing and 
spending measures can arise in a variety of other contexts as well. It may arise, for example, 
in the application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See infra notes 154-73 and accom­
panying text. It may also arise in the application of federal statutes that ban specific forms of 
discriminatory state taxation. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979) 
(construing 15 U.S.C. § 391, which bars discriminatory state taxation of the generation or 
transmission of electricity). 
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in all these doctrinal settings, for determining whether courts 
should "link" trucing and spending measures when evaluating their 
constitutionality. As our analysis of the existing authorities will 
show, courts have failed to recognize the commonality of these 
cases and the subtlety of the questions they present. Instead, courts 
have resolved the cases in an ad hoc fashion, relying at best on the 
conclusory shibboleth that "substance" should triumph over 
"form." What the law needs is a more informative and principled 
framework for addressing this broad set of questions. In this arti­
cle, we offer such a framework in the hope that it will help courts as 
they are forced to apply the now-impoverished "law of linkage." 
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. The Nondiscrimination Principle 
Even absent preemptive congressional action, the Commerce 
Clause proscribes state laws that offend the Constitution's purpose 
of creating a "national common market."6 It is a "cardinal require­
ment"7 of this "dormant Commerce Clause" rule8 that state taxes 
may not discriminate against interstate commerce.9 Two cases from 
1984 illustrate the operation of this constitutional requirement. In 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 10 the Court struck down a Hawaii 
tax imposed on liquor wholesalers because it exempted sales of cer­
tain liquors manufactured in Hawaii. Similarly, in Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. v. Tully,11 the Court found the New York corporate 
income tax unconstitutional to the extent it afforded a credit solely 
for corporate export activities that occurred within the state. In 
Bacchus, Westinghouse, and many other cases, the Court has held 
state tax laws unconstitutional because "no State may discriminato-
6. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977); see also C 
& A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 410 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Hunt). 
7. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988). 
8. Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995). 
9. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) ("[T]he cardinal prin­
ciple [is] that a State may not 'benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors."') (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S. at 273-274)). The Court has often recognized 
this principle in its decisions. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 65 U.S.L.W. 4337, 4340 (U.S. May 19, 1997) (No. 94-1988). Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318, 329 
(1977); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959). 
10. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
11. 466 U.S. 388 (1984). 
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rily tax the products manufactured or the business operations per­
formed in any other State."12 
B. Permissible Subsidization of Domestic Industry 
Just as the Court has consistently held that the Commerce 
Clause bars state taxes that favor in-state over out-of-state interests, 
so it has endorsed a countervailing principle that the Commerce 
Clause permits state spending that favors in-state over out-of-state 
interests. "Direct subsidization of domestic industry," a unanimous 
Court has declared, "does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant 
Commerce Clause] prohibition."13 The Court's explanation for this 
Commerce Clause dichotomy between state taxes that favor local 
interests and state subsidies that favor local interests is that "[t]he 
Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give 
its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of 
that description in connection with the State's regulation of interstate 
commerce. "14 Whatever difficulties this distinction may engender, ts 
the Court has reached different conclusions on the constitutionality 
of domestic preference legislation depending on whether the pref­
erence takes the form of the exercise of the state's regulating or 
taxing power, on the one hand, or its spending power, on the other. 
In New Energy Co. v. Limbach,16 the state sought to sidestep 
the rule condemning taxes that discriminate against interstate com­
merce by drawing upon the distinction between tax relief and 
affirmative state spending. At issue in the case was an Ohio motor 
fuel sales tax that provided the seller with a credit for all sales of 
ethanol17 produced in the state, but not all sales of ethanol pro­
duced in other jurisdictions. Seeking to avert the dormant 
Commerce Clause ban on discriminatory taxation, the state argued 
that the credit was a "subsidy" that the state could direct as it 
wished to favored local ethanol suppliers.1s 
12. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 337; see also Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 271-73 
{collecting early cases). 
13. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 {1988). 
14. 486 U.S. at 278. 
15. And we have traced them at length elsewhere. See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the 
Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 
{1989); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business 
Development Incentives, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 789 {1996). 
16. 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
17. Ethanol is a colloquial term for ethyl alcohol. It is typically made from com and can 
be mixed with gasoline to produce a motor fuel called "gasohol." 
18. See 486 U.S. at 277-78. 
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The Court accepted the major premise of this argument by rec­
ognizing that the Commerce Clause ordinarily does not proscribe 
subsidies for local industry.19 But the state's minor premise - that 
its tax credit involved such protected subsidization - did not fare 
as well. In the Court's eyes, the ethanol credit was caught up with 
"Ohio's assessment and computation of its fuel sales tax,"20 requir­
ing the Court to consider the duty-imposing terms of the tax and its 
relief-granting credit provision together. From this perspective, it 
followed \vithout difficulty that the tax was unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. 
C. West Lynn Creamery 
In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 21 decided six years after 
New Energy, the Court encountered another state effort to skirt the 
dormant Commerce Clause through invocation of a claimed power 
to subsidize. West Lynn Creamery involved a Massachusetts milk 
"pricing order" that, in substance, placed a tax on wholesale distrib­
utors for every local sale of milk, whether that milk was produced 
inside or outside the state.22 In addition, the order stipulated that 
all proceeds of the tax would go into a segregated fund that the 
state periodically would disperse solely to in-state milk producers 
(that is, local dairy farmers).23 
The issue in the case was one of characterization. Did the 
pricing order, as Massachusetts argued, impose a permissible non­
discriminatory tax coupled with the sort of "subsidization of domes­
tic industry" approved in New Energy,24 or did it embody a tax, 
coupled with de facto tax relief for local industry, in violation of the 
Court's well-settled antidiscrimination rule?25 This characterization 
issue sharply divided the Court, with Justice Stevens writing for a 
five-Justice majority; Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, con­
curring in the judgment; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent. 
19. See 486 U.S. at 278. 
20. 486 U.S. at 278. 
21. 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
22. 512 U.S. at 190-91. 
23. See 512 U.S. at 191. Under limited circumstances, portions of the fund would not be 
paid to producers; such undistributed funds would simply be returned to milk dealers, thus 
effectively reducing their total tax burden. See 512 U.S. at 191 n.8. 
24. 512 U.S. at 199 n.15 (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278). 
25. See 512 U.S. at 199. 
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For the majority, the discriminatory-tax label "clearly" fit.26 In 
so ruling, the majority assumed that either an evenhanded milk tax 
or a state's outright payment of cash subsidies to local dairy farmers 
would be constitutional "standing alone."2 7 But, in the majority's 
eyes, the tax and subsidy did not operate in isolation. Rather, the 
Court focused on the program "as a whole"28 and found that the 
subsidy payments in effect were "rebates" or "refunds" of the tax.29 
Accordingly, the Massachusetts scheme was unconstitutional 
because, like a protective tariff, it allowed "Massachusetts dairy 
farmers who produce at higher cost to sell at or below the price 
charged by lower cost out-of-state producers."30 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia faulted Justice Stevens 
for writing so broadly as to imperil the constitutionality of virtually 
all state business subsidy programs.31 Justice Scalia acknowledged 
that a local-industry-favoring "'exemption' from or 'credit' against 
a 'neutral' tax" would offend the ban on discriminatory taxation.32 
He also asserted, however, that "not . . . every state law which 
obstructs a national market violates the Commerce Clause,"33 and 
that, in particular, there was no constitutional problem with a "sub­
sidy for the in-state members of the industry" even if it was coupled 
with "nondiscriminatory taxation of the industry."34 For Justice 
Scalia, the determinative issue was straightforward: Which of these 
two competing principles controlled the case?3S 
Although Justice Scalia thought the question was "close,"36 he 
joined the majority in concluding that Massachusetts had engaged 
in "discriminatory taxation" because the pricing-order payments 
constituted "rebates" of the pricing-order tax.3 7 This was true in 
Justice Scalia's view, however, only because the payments came out 
of a "segregated fund" created with the proceeds of the tax.38 Had 
the taxes gone into "the State's general revenue fund," the pay-
26. 512 U.S. at 194. 
27. 512 U.S. at 199. 
28. 512 U.S. at 201. 
29. 512 U.S. at 195-97 & n.10. 
30. 512 U.S. at 195. 
31. See 512 U.S. at 207-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
32. 512 U.S. at 211. 
33. 512 U.S. at 207. 
34. 512 U.S. at 210. 
35. See 512 U.S. at 211. 
36. 512 U.S. at 211. 
37. 512 U.S. at 210-11. 
38. 512 U.S. at 210. 
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ments made to in-state dairy farmers would not have constituted a 
"discriminatory refund" but instead would have qualified as the 
sort of affirmative subsidization approved by the Court in New 
Energy.39 
The dissenters challenged both the majority and concurring 
opinions. Emphasizing that the state tax fell exclusively on milk 
dealers while ·the subsidy favored milk producers, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist could find no constitutional problem at all in the 
Massachusetts program. Instead, for the dissenters, the program 
embodied an "evenhanded"40 tax and the sort of subsidy for a 
favored industry group that the Court had approved in "case after 
case."41 
D. A Short Analysis 
West Lynn Creamery, like many cases involving linkage issues, is 
subject to serious criticism on its own terms. In this section - as in 
similar sections in Parts II and m of this article - we offer such a 
critique. We do so, however, not merely to point out the analytical 
flaws in the opinions in the case, but, more important for present 
purposes, to demonstrate the need for the principled approach to 
the linkage question that we offer in Part IV. 
The issue in West Lynn Creamery was whether the Court should 
view the Massachusetts milk dealer tax and producer subsidy inde­
pendently or instead consider the tax and subsidy as parts of an 
integrated whole, thus rendering the Massachusetts program a de 
facto discriminatory tax. Justice Scalia embraced the latter position 
by reasoning that the subsidies were equivalent to tax "rebates," 
but found this characterization apt only because they came out of a 
segregated fund. This analysis is problematic, however, as a matter 
of both form and substance. It is problematic as a matter of form 
because the characterization of payments as rebates has nothing to 
do with their extraction from a segregated fund; rather, a rebate, 
which is nothing more than "a return of a part of a payment,"42 
typically comes out of the same general revenue fund into which 
rebated income, property, or other taxes previously have been paid. 
Justice Scalia's analysis is problematic as a matter of substance as 
well because, in his view, only the slightest legislative alteration 
39. 512 U.S. at 211. 
40. 512 U.S. at 214 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
41. 512 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
42. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW CoLI.EGIATE D1cnoNARY 981 (1986). 
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would have cured the Massachusetts program's constitutional infir­
mity. Following Justice Scalia's logic, Massachusetts could have 
imposed the same taxes in the same amounts on the same milk 
dealers, and paid the same subsidies in the same amounts to the 
same milk producers, if only the state had run the tax payments 
into, and the subsidies back out of, the state's general fund.43 
In light of these troublesome points, it is not surprising that the 
majority eschewed Justice Scalia's pivotal "segregated fund" dis­
tinction. Instead, the majority deemed the "tax rebate" label appli­
cable because the legislative dynamics that produced the tax-and­
subsidy program were no different from those that produce com­
merce-impeding taxes paired with unconstitutional resident­
favoring exemptions or credits. Thus, 
when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the 
groups hurt by the tax, a state's political processes can no longer be 
relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state 
interests [that is, local dairy farmers] which would otherwise lobby 
against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.44 
In other words, the "tax rebate" label fit because oppressive taxa­
tion of nonresident businesses was as likely to result from the simul­
taneous consideration of a general tax and a local-producer­
favoring subsidy as from the simultaneous consideration of a gen­
eral tax and a local-producer-favoring exemption or credit. 
The majority opinion, like the concurrence, is susceptible to 
serious criticism. A fundamental difficulty with the majority's logic 
lies in its basic premise. The underlying assumption seems to be 
that what renders the ordinary local-business-favoring tax break 
constitutionally odious is its contemporaneous enactment with an 
otherwise "neutral" tax that burdens interstate as well as intrastate 
commerce. But this assumption is misplaced because many tax 
breaks invalidated by courts have been adopted long after enact­
ment of the "neutral" tax from which the tax break affords discrimi­
natory relief.45 Indeed, in New Energy itself, the fuel sales tax had 
been on the books for many years before the Ohio legislature 
adopted the ethanol-production sales tax credit that favored local 
43. Cf. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany, 943 F. Supp. 83, 87-88 (D. Me. 1996) (relying 
in part on Justice Scalia's concurrence in sustaining "nonintegrated" tax-and-subsidy scheme 
similar to the scheme at issue in West Lynn Creamery except that, among other things, subsi­
dies were paid out of a general fund). 
44. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200. 
45. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984) (noting that liquor 
tax was enacted in 1939, while discriminatory exemptions took effect in 1971 and 1976); 
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318, 319 (1977) (noting that state legisla­
ture, in 1968, enacted a discriminatory exemption to tax imposed since 1905). 
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industry and rendered the overall taxing scheme invalid.46 Put dif­
ferently, under the Court's dormant Commerce Clause precedents, 
it is the fact of the discrimination - rather than its timing - that 
renders resident-favoring tax relief provisions unconstitutional. 
Given this principle, it seems odd that the West Lynn Creamery 
majority so readily deemed the state's timing in adopting the sub­
sidy of central significance in finding a constitutional violation.47 
A second problem with the majority's analysis in West Lynn 
Creamery lies in its failure to respond to the central criticism lev­
eled by the dissent. As we have seen, the majority found that the 
Massachusetts program violated the Commerce Clause ban on dis­
criminatory taxation because, in its view, the milk-producer pay­
ments were easily characterized as tax "rebates."48 As a matter of 
common usage, however, tax rebates and refunds are paid out to 
the same person who previously paid the rebated or refunded tax.49 
Yet under the Massachusetts pricing order - as the dissenters took 
pains to emphasize - "the nondiscriminatory tax levied against all 
milk dealers [was] coupled with a subsidy to milk producers."50 
Given this feature of the Massachusetts program, it was not at all 
clear why the majority could so comfortably assert that the "rebate" 
or "refund" label was apt. 
Although the majority and concurring opinions in West Lynn 
Creamery are subject to additional criticisms,51 the foregoing dis­
cussion suffices to make three key points. First, in applying the 
Commerce Clause prohibition on discriminatory taxation, courts 
will confront important questions about whether they should treat 
subsidies as freestanding exercises of the state's spending power, on 
the one hand, or as tax credits or exemptions, on the other. Second, 
the difficult task of answering these questions must for now proceed 
unguided by any well-developed jurisprudential theory offered by 
the Supreme Court. Finally, the conflicting and unsatisfying opin­
ions in West Lynn Creamery signal the difficulties that beset this 
46. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 272 (1988). 
47. We will see in due course that the state's contemporaneous adoption of the tax and 
the subsidy does help justify the result in West Lynn Creamery. See infra notes 223-39 and 
accompanying text The Court, however, never paused to offer an adequate explanation -
or indeed any explanation - of why this was the case. 
48. See 512 U.S. at 197. 
49. See BALLENTINE's LAW D1cnONARY 1062 (3d ed. 1969) (defining "rebate" as "[a] 
giving back"); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text 
50. 512 U.S. at 214 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
51. See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause (1996) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
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area of the law and the need for bringing to it a more coherent 
approach. 
II. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
A. The Nondiscrimination Principle 
The dormant Commerce Clause is not the only limit on state 
taxing powers designed to advance constitutional interests in 
nationalism. Another restriction lies in the so-called "doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity."52 Beginning with its seminal rul­
ing in M'Culloch v. Maryland,53 the Court repeatedly has insisted 
that the Constitution bars state taxes that discriminate against the 
federal government.54 More recently, Congress has implemented 
this tax-immunity principle in a number of federal statutes, includ­
ing 4 U.S.C. § 111.55 Codifying the holding of a previous Supreme 
Court decision, § 111 authorizes state taxation of "pay or compen­
sation" of federal employees, but only "if the taxation does not dis­
criminate against the [federal] employee because of the source of 
the pay or compensation."56 This express statutory ban on state tax 
52. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 810 (1989). Although the doctrine 
still goes by this name, it may more accurately be characterized today as the doctrine of 
federal immunity from state taxation. The reciprocal character of the immunity, which was 
first articulated in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11Wall.) 113 (1871) (invalidating federal income 
tax on salary of state judge), and applied over much of the next seven decades, has been 
reduced almost to the point of nonexistence in the Court's modern decisions. See, e.g., South 
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (holding that intergovernmental tax immunity doc­
trine does not bar federal income taxation of state and local bond interest); Massachusetts v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (holding that intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine 
does not bar federal excise tax on state police helicopter); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 
405 (1938) (holding that intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine does not bar federal 
income tax on wages of most state employees). 
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
54. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 732 (1982). Apart from its 
antidiscrimination component, the tax-immunity doctrine operates to invalidate state taxes 
that place a "direct burden" on the federal government or its instrumentalities. 455 U.S. at 
732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 
134, 150 (1937) (quoting Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 225 (1931))). This separate aspect of 
the tax-immunity principle is not implicated by the analysis set forth here. 
55. Analogous statutes include 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1994) (authorizing only nondiscrimina­
tory state taxes on national banks) and 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (1994) (authorizing only nondiscrim­
inatory franchise taxes on federal obligations). The application of these statutes can and will 
present exactly the same sort of linkage conundrums raised by 4 U.S.C. § 111. 
56. 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1994). The Supreme Court holding codified in 4 U.S.C. § 111 was that 
of Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (overruling line of cases that 
exempted federal employees from nondiscriminatory state taxation). As the Court later 
explained in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 812 (1989): 
By the time the statute was enacted . . •  the decision in Graves had been announced, 
so the constitutional immunity doctrine no longer proscribed nondiscriminatory state 
taxation of federal employees. In effect, § 111 simply codified the result in Graves and 
foreclosed the possibility that subsequent judicial reconsideration of that case might 
reestablish the broader interpretation of the immunity doctrine. 
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discrimination has given rise to linkage questions no less intriguing 
than those that mark the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce 
Clause decisions. 
These linkage questions have their immediate origin in Davis v. 
Michigan Department of the Treasury.51 In Davis, a federal retiree 
challenged a state statute that excluded from state income taxation 
retirement payments made to former state - but not federal -
employees. Focusing on the statute's outright favoritism of state 
over federal pensioners, an eight-Justice majority struck down the 
taxing scheme as violative of the intergovernmental tax immunity 
doctrine. 
Justice Stevens wrote a strong dissent.58 In his view, because the 
state treated federal employees like all but "a small percentage"59 
of "ordinary residents of the State,"60 there existed in Davis pre­
cisely the sort of "political check against abuse of the taxing power" 
that was lacking in past decisions applying the intergovernmental 
tax immunity doctrine.61 Building on this theme, Justice Stevens 
added: 
Even if it were appropriate to determine the discriminatory nature 
of a tax system by comparing the treatment of federal employees with 
the treatment of another discrete group of persons, it is peculiarly 
inappropriate to focus solely on the treatment of state governmental 
employees. The State may always compensate in pay or salary for 
what it assesses in taxes .... It trivializes the Supremacy Clause to 
interpret it as prohibiting the States from providing through this lim­
ited tax exemption what the State has an unquestionable right to pro­
vide through increased retirement benefits. 62 
In other words, Justice Stevens claimed that (1) a state generally 
may give former state employees additional retirement payments 
free from intergovernmental tax immunity constraints, and (2) the 
award of a tax exemption to state retirees constituted an additional 
payment for purposes of this principle.63 
The majority did not question the first of these propositions, but 
it rejected any suggestion that the difference between a tax exemp-
57. 489 U.S. 803 {1989). 
58. 489 U.S. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
59. 489 U.S. at 821. 
60. 489 U.S. at 824. 
61. 489 U.S. at 820 (intepial quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. County 
of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 463 (1977)). 
62. 489 U.S. at 824. 
63. Following his appointment to the Court, Justice Thomas expressed agreement with 
Justice Stevens's Davis dissent. See Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594, 605 (1992) (Stevens, 
joined by Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
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tion and a benefit increase was legally inconsequential. There was a 
difference between the two forms of state action, in the majorityts 
view, because 
[i]n order to provide the same after-tax benefits to all retired state 
employees by means of increased salaries or benefit payments instead 
of a tax exemption, the State would have to increase its outlays by 
more than the cost of the current tax exemption, since the increased 
payments to retirees would result in higher federal income tax pay­
ments in some circumstances.64 
The Court went on to observe that "[t]axes enacted to reduce the 
State's employment costs at the expense of the federal treasury are 
the type of discriminatory legislation that the doctrine of intergov­
ernmental tax immunity is intended to bar."65 
As we shall see, the Court's distinction between payments and 
tax exemptions based on their susceptibility to federal income taxa­
tion is highly problematic.66 A more satisfactory explanation of the 
decision may be that the Court in Davis, as in New Energy, focused 
on the very terms of the statutory pronouncement the state legisla­
ture itself had crafted. On this view, because the Michigan statute 
on its face provided a tax exemption that rendered the actual tax 
obligations of former state and federal employees unequal, the state 
violated the mandate that state "taxation . . . not discriminate 
against the . . .  [federal] employee."6 7 
B. The Post-Davis Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Cases 
The Court's decision in Davis unleashed a nationwide outpour­
ing of litigation in which federal retirees asserted that state taxing 
schemes violated the intergovernmental tax immunity rule. State 
legislatures, duty-bound after Davis to remove provisions favoring 
state over federal retirees from their taxing systems, went to work 
as well. Two obvious cures for the malady were available, but each 
was painful. First, state legislators could eliminate the exemption 
afforded state employees. This response, however, was sure to raise 
a hue and cry - and dim the electoral appeal of incumbents -
among the politically potent voting bloc made up of all former and 
current state employees. Alternatively, state legislators could 
64. 489 U.S. at 815 n.4. 
65. 489 U.S. at 815 n.4. 
66. See infra notes 208-22 and accompanying text. 
67. 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1994) (emphasis added); see Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 (noting that it is 
"undisputed that Michigan's tax system discriminates in favor of retired state employees and 
against retired federal employees" before turning to Michigan's defense of its "inconsistent 
treatment of Federal and State Government retirees"). 
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extend the retirement income exemption afforded state retirees to 
federal retirees as well. But this response was likely to generate 
limited political capital for lawmakers, while forcing them to lay 
new tax burdens on (or reduce services to) other vocal 
constituents.68 
Faced with this dilemma, the legislatures of two states came up 
with an imaginative response. In both Montana and Oregon, 
lawmakers removed any facial discrimination in the tax statute 
itself by repealing the exemption for state retirement income. To 
placate newly taxed state-retiree constituents, however, these legis­
latures simultaneously provided for increased retirement 
payments.69 
Not surprisingly, former federal employees - who ended up in 
exactly the same taxpaying position they had occupied prior to 
Davis - attacked these legislative gambits. In essence, they argued 
that the increased benefit payments afforded state retirees consti­
tuted "rebates " or "refunds " of the new state taxes laid on state 
retirees by reason of the repeal of their preexisting tax exemption. 
For this reason, the federal-retiree plaintiffs argued, the Montana 
and Oregon schemes continued to violate the "mandate of equal 
treatment "70 imposed on states by Davis. 
In Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Division, 71 the 
Montana Supreme Court found the legislature's new-tax-and-new­
benefits response to Davis unconstitutional. In Ragsdale v. 
Department of Revenue, 12 on the other hand, the Oregon Supreme 
Court found the legislature's use of this strategy permissible. This 
disparity in results, in cases so similar, underscores the difficulty of 
deciding whether ostensible exercises of the state spending power 
should be characterized as "rebates " for purposes of constitutional 
prohibitions on discriminatory taxation. 
1. Sheehy 
In Sheehy, the Montana Supreme Court considered whether the 
state violated section 111 when it awarded an "annual retirement 
adjustment payment " to state retirees at the same time it repealed 
68. Extension of the exemption to federal retirees was likely to yield limited political 
returns because many federal retirees would view the reform as the result of judicial inter­
vention, rather than of freely chosen legislative action, in that the action came only after the 
Supreme Court's decision in Davis. 
69. See infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text. 
70. Davis, 489 U.S. at 818. 
71. 864 P .2d 762 (Mont. 1993). 
72. 895 P.2d 1348 (Or.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995). 
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its tax exemption for state retirement income.73 In ruling that the 
state's program was unlawful, the court deemed it dispositive that 
the added retirement benefit was "intended to make up, in part, " 
for the new tax liability placed on state retirees.74 This finding was 
supported by three key facts. First, the equalization of retiree tax 
burdens and the increase in state retiree benefits were "included in 
and part of the same bill " enacted immediately in the wake of 
Davis. 1s Second, the benefit adjustment was given only to resident 
retirees-who alone, under then-existing state law, were subject to 
the newly created tax liability -rather than to "all ... retirees, " 
including nonresidents, "in recognition of their years of public ser­
vice. "76 Third, the retirement benefit adjustments - unlike prior 
grants of additional retirement payments -were to be paid out of 
the general revenues rather than out of the state's separate retire­
ment fund.77 
Under these circumstances, the court ruled that the newly cre­
ated adjustment was "not an actual and legitimate pension or retire­
ment benefit, "78 but instead a "partial tax rebate denominated 
otherwise in an attempt to evade the requirements of federal 
law."79 As a result, the court found that Montana's award of the 
new benefits violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine 
no less than the discriminatory exemption of state retiree income 
outlawed in Davis itself.BO 
2. Ragsdale 
In Ragsdale, the Oregon Supreme Court confronted the same 
sort of tax-equalization/benefit-increase response to Davis that 
73. Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 764. 
74. 864 P .2d at 768. 
75. 864 P .2d at 767. 
76. 864 P .2d at 768. 
77. See 864 P.2d at 768. 
78. 864 P .2d at 768. 
79. 864 P.2d at 768; see also 864 P.2d at 769 ("The disparate treatment is based entirely on 
the State's desire to continue to provide an advantage to those of its own retirees losing a 
pre-Davis advantage . . • •  "). 
80. There were two opinions apart from the majority opinion. In the first, Judge 
Rapkoch Goined by Justice Trieweiler) agreed that "the adjustment . .. constitutes discrimi­
natory taxation," because it was part of "a byzantine effort to avoid Davis." 864 P.2d at 771-
72 (Rapkoch, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, Judge 
Rapkoch disagreed with the majority as to the severability of the benefit-adjustment provi­
sion from the remainder of the reformatory statute. In the other separate opinion, Judge 
Weber - the sole dissenter on the § 111 issue - reasoned that the benefit adjustment was a 
permissible "increase in pay" that the state could grant - regardless of its inclusion with the 
tax exemption repeal - for the purpose of discouraging state retirees from moving out of 
state. 864 P.2d at 774-75 (Weber, J., specially concurring and dissenting). 
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sparked the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Sheehy. In a 5-2 
decision, however, the Oregon Supreme Court rebuffed the inter­
governmental tax immunity challenge by refusing to characterize 
the payment increase to state retirees as "in effect, a tax rebate or 
tax benefit. "8 1 In reaching this result, the court distinguished 
Sheehy on two grounds. First, unlike the benefit adjustments in 
Sheehy, Oregon's benefit increases were not limited to state resi­
dents. Instead, they were payable to all former state employees, 
including retirees who had relocated outside the state. Second, the 
new benefits were not drawn from the general treasury, but instead 
came out of the same state retirement fund from which other retire­
ment benefits had been paid in the past.8 2 
The court in Ragsdale also emphasized that "there is no mathe- · 
matical correlation between taxes and the [new] benefits created, "8 3 
which instead were calculated solely "on an employee's years of 
service."8 4 Thus, "[s]ome state retirees who will be required to pay 
state income taxes on their ... retirement benefits will receive no 
additional benefits under the ... law, " while "some state retirees 
who will pay no state income taxes will receive additional bene­
fits. "8 5 The court found it noteworthy as well that the added bene­
fits - unlike true state tax exemptions - were subject to state and 
federal taxation.8 6 
In sum, according to the Ragsdale majority, "[i]nter­
governmental tax immunity ... is concerned with discriminatory tax 
treatment."8 7 The added benefits, however, were not a "tax rebate 
or tax benefit, "8 8 but instead reflected the State's effort "to fix the 
level of its employees' compensation "8 9 by way of the "expenditure 
of trust funds."9 0 The court stressed that such spending decisions 
are "subject to a watchful electorate that includes a vast majority of 
people who are not state employees."9 1 
81. Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P 2d 1348, 1353 (Or.), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 569 (1995). 
82. See 895 P.2d at 1356. 
83. 895 P.2d at 1350. 
84. 895 P.2d at 1350. 
85. 895 P.2d at 1350. 
86. See 895 P.2d at 1355; see also 895 P2d at 1354, 1357. 
87. 895 P.2d at 1353 (emphasis added). 
88. 895 P.2d at 1354. 
89. 895 P 2d at 1357. 
90. 895 P.2d at 1354. 
91. 895 P.2d at 1357. 
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C. Some Shortcomings in the Ragsdale Analysis 
As in section I.D, we offer the following critique of Ragsdale not 
merely to point out the analytical flaws in the opinion, but, more 
important for present purposes, to demonstrate the need for the 
principled approach to the linkage question that we offer in Part 
IV. 
The Oregon statute, as the court observed in Ragsdale, "con­
tains indicia that could lead one to conclude either that the 'bene­
fits' are a kind of tax rebate or that the 'benefits' are 
compensation. "92 The issue presented to the court was whether the 
"rebate " label or the "compensation " label was more apt. 
Whatever the proper resolution of this issue, the majority's analysis 
in the Ragsdale case is marked by several analytical shortcomings. 
First, there exists a basic flaw in the Ragsdale court's attempt to 
distinguish Sheehy on the twin grounds that the Montana benefits 
(unlike the Oregon benefits) were paid (1) only to resident retirees 
and (2) from the state's general treasury rather than from the 
retirement fund. The difficulty is that the court in Sheehy did not 
seem to find these considerations important in and of themselves; 
rather the Montana court focused on these facts because they sup­
ported a more general and case-dispositive finding that the legisla­
ture had adopted the payment increase for the very purpose of 
offsetting the newly imposed tax. 93 In Ragsdale, however, this point 
was never even contested. Rather, the court recognized, without 
any controversy at all, that the legislature had "increased . . .  retire­
ment benefits to compensate state retirees, in part, for their 
increased income tax obligations. "94 Thus, the Ragsdale court's 
92. 895 P . 2d at 1353-54. 
93. See Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 76 2, 768 (Mont. 1993). 
94. Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1352. The two grounds on which the Ragsdale court attempted 
to distinguish Sheehy are questionable for other reasons as well. First, the court sought to 
differentiate Sheehy by pointing out that Oregon had afforded identical treatment to resident 
and nonresident retirees, whereas Montana had limited its benefit payment to former state 
employees who continued to reside in Montana. This distinction, however, seems shaky 
because the intergovernmental immunity doctrine is designed to assure equality between 
state and federal interests, not between residents and nonresidents. See Gilson v. Depart­
ment of Treasury, 544 N.W.2d 673 (Mich. Ct. App.1996) (holding that neither Davis nor the 
intergovernmental immunity doctrine precludes states from taxing the retirement income of 
former employees of other states while exempting the retirement income of their own former 
employees); Harmon v. Director of Revenue, 894 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1995) (same); Alarid v. 
Secretary of the N.M. Dept. of Taxation & Revenue, 878 P.2d 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) 
(same), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1081 (1995). Simpson v. Department of Revenue, 870 P.2d 8 24 
(Or. 1994) (per curiam) (same). In addition, this distinction provides a potentially easy 
means of evading the underlying principle of Sheehy, at least if the great majority of state 
retirees continue to live in the same state where they worked as public employees. 
Second, the Ragsdale court's distinguishing of Sheehy on the ground that the additional 
benefit payments in that case came from the general treasury, rather than from the segre-
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attempt to distinguish Sheehy - while built on an understandable 
identification of factual differences - fails to take account of the 
essential reasoning of the Montana court. Indeed, attaching the 
tax-relief label to the new Oregon benefits seemed even more 
appropriate than in Sheehy because the Oregon legislature had spe­
cifically provided that the increased retirement benefits would be 
paid only so long as state retiree income remained taxable.95 
More problematic than the Ragsdale court's questionable suc­
cess in distinguishing Sheehy was its failure even to mention the 
Supreme Court's freshly minted decision in West Lynn Creamery.96 
In West Lynn Creamery, after all, the Court had emphatically 
insisted on looking at the practical effect of a tax and spending 
mandate "as a whole."97 The Ragsdale majority, however, drove an 
analytical wedge between the state's decision to treat state retire­
ment payments as taxable income - which the court found unob­
jectionable because it simply extended Oregon's nondiscriminatory 
personal income tax to state retirement benefits - and the state's 
simultaneous award of cash payments limited to state retirees -
which the court deemed unobjectionable because those payments 
constituted permissible state "expenditures."98 
West Lynn Creamery also undermines the effort of the majority 
in Ragsdale to defend the extra retirement benefit by comparing 
that payment increase to a legislative decision made in a later year 
to give retirees a cost-of-living adjustment.99 After all, the majority 
in West Lynn Creamery found a problem of constitutional policy 
gated retirement fund, is weak because both the retirement fund and the general treasury 
were funded by general tax revenues. To be sure, the increased benefits in Ragsdale were 
funded by employer contributions to the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System. See 
895 P.2d at 1356. These employers, however, were "the State . .. and . .. its political subdivi­
sions and instrumentalities," 895 P.2d at 1349 n.2, which presumably derive their funds -
including the funds used to make contributions to the Oregon Public Employees Retirement 
System - in large measure from tax revenues. Indeed, according to Justice Scalia's logic in 
West Lynn Creamery, the payment of increased benefits from the segregated retirement fund 
may have rendered Oregon's program more constitutionally problematic than the program at 
issue in Sheehy, because, among other things, it reduced opportunities for periodic legislative 
reappraisal, and possible repeal, of the benefit awards. See supra notes 31-39, 4 2, and accom­
panying text. Perhaps for these reasons, the court in Sheehy itself downplayed its reliance on 
the state's payment of increased benefits out of general treasury funds, deeming that fact 
"not conclusive." Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 768. 
95. See Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1351; see also 895 P .2d at 1358 (Gillette, J., dissenting) 
("[That Oregon payments constitute] a partial refund of state taxes " is "demonstrated ineluc­
tably by the fact that the increased .. . retirement benefits are not p�yable in any year in 
which . . .  retirement benefits are exempt from Oregon personal income taxation. "). 
96. The West Lynn Creamery case is discussed supra section J. C. 
97. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 51 2 U.S. 186, 201 (1994). 
98. 895 P .2d at 1354. 
99. See 895 P.2d at 1353 n.11. 
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precisely because - just as in Ragsdale - the new obligation and 
new payment right were created simultaneously as part of an inte­
grated legislative package.100 In addition, West Lynn Creamery pro­
vided ammunition for an a fortiori argument of unconstitutionality 
in Ragsdale because Oregon's payments were made - as true 
"rebates " are - back into the hands of the very class of persons on 
whom the new tax liability was imposed.101 
Despite the preceding criticism of Ragsdale, there is something 
to be said for the result the majority reached in that case. Most 
important, the emphasis in Davis itself on the distinction between 
government-supplied payments, which are subject to federal 
income tax, and government-supplied tax exemptions, which are 
not, supports the result in Ragsdale - although it also suggests that 
the court erred in Sheehy.102 There also may be force in the argu­
ment that, because states can increase retirement benefits in gen­
eral, they should be able to raise benefits contemporaneously with 
the enactment of a new tax. Again, however, this argument sug­
gests that Sheehy is misbegotten.103 So which court got it wrong ­
the court in Ragsdale or the court in Sheehy? We shall return to 
this question after we have developed in detail our general method­
ology for assessing linkage cases. 
III. UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
We have thus far considered the question of suspect linkage 
between the imposition of a tax and the payment of governmental 
funds in the context of federal constitutional restraints on state tax­
ing power. In West Lynn Creamery, the earmarking of revenues 
from a nondiscriminatory tax for a group of in-state beneficiaries 
led the Court to characterize the simultaneously enacted taxing and 
spending measures as an integrated scheme that violated the 
Commerce Clause. Similarly, in Sheehy, the repeal of a tax exemp­
tion that the state had granted for state - but not federal - retire­
ment income, coupled with an increase in retirement benefits for 
100. See 51 2 U.S. at 200; supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing Court's reliance on this 
distinction in Davis). 
103. Not surprisingly, Judge Weber made precisely this argument. See Sheehy v. Public 
Employees Retirement Div., 864 P. 2d 76 2, 774 (Mont. 1993) (Weber, J., specially concurring 
and dissenting) ("If the same adjustment payment provided in the Act were provided in 
another act in some future year, and denominated a cost of living, no one would even raise 
the discrimination argument. I do not find a basis to condemn the adjustment merely 
because it is included with the tax."). 
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state retirees, led the court to find a discriminatory "rebate" that 
violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. In Ragsdale, 
on the other hand, the court was unwilling to condemn under the 
intergovernmental immunity doctrine a tax and spending package 
that effectively relieved state retirees from the burdens borne by 
federal retirees under the state income tax. 
Analogous questions of suspect linkage between taxing and 
spending measures arise under state constitutional provisions. In 
particular, when the state provides tax reductions or abatements to 
a narrow group of taxpayers, the question arises as to how a court 
should characterize such "payments." Should the court view them 
as integrally related to the underlying taxing scheme and therefore 
violative of state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and 
equality in taxation?104 Or should the court instead treat them as 
independent governmental expenditures, which are not subject to 
uniformity and equality restraints? Courts addressing such ques­
tions raised by state constitutional restraints have responded with 
discordant answers. 
In Westvaco Corp. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue, 105 
the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of a credit against property taxes funded with the proceeds of a 
local option sales tax. Tue property tax credit was calculated as a 
fixed, single proportion of the fair market value of the property, 
regardless of its classification. Tue property taxes for which the 
credit was granted, however, followed the constitutional mandate 
that varying classifications of property be taxed according to 
defined percentages of fair market value - namely, 10.5% for 
industrial property, 6% for commercial property, and 4% for 
owner-occupied residential property. As a consequence, the prop­
erty tax credit effectively reconfigured the relative tax burden 
borne by property according to the state's constitutionally imposed 
classification scheme and did so in a way that disfavored industrial 
property owners.106 
104. See generally 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE 
TAXATION 'l( 2.01 ( 2d ed. 1993). 
105. 467 S.E . 2d 739 ( S. C. 1995) (per curiam). In the interest of full disclosure, it should 
be noted that Walter Hellerstein represented Westvaco Corporation in the Westvaco case. 
The views expressed here, however, are his own (and those of Professor Coenen) and do not 
necessarily represent those of Westvaco Corporation. 
106. The South Carolina Constitution explicitly provides for the relative share of the 
property tax burden that is to be borne by different classes of property. It does so by pre­
scribing specified percentages of the property's fair market value that is to be placed on the 
tax rolls for assessment purposes. In particular, as noted in the text, the South Carolina 
Constitution provides that, for assessment purposes, 10.5% of the fair market value of indus-
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The court in Westvaco confronted essentially the same issue 
presented in West Lynn Creamery, Sheehy, and Ragsdale: whether 
the sales-tax-funded property tax credit and the property tax itself 
should be viewed as an integrated whole. The industrial-property­
owning taxpayer, not surprisingly, claimed that the inexorable 
effect of the credit was to rearrange the relative tax burdens borne 
by various classes of property in violation of the constitutionally 
prescribed tax-burden-sharing relationships. The state, in contrast, 
argued that the court should not consider the joint operation of the 
tax and the credit, but instead should uphold the scheme because 
the property tax, standing alone, conformed to the constitutional 
mandate. In the end, the court agreed with the state on the ground 
that the credit was properly viewed as a separate spending measure. 
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that "the plain 
language" of the uniformity and equality provision of the South 
Carolina Constitution "does not impose uniformity on the distribu­
tion of taxes."107 Rather, uniformity is required only "in the assess­
ment of all property, "108 so that, in the court's view, uniformity is 
obtained "when property taxes are levied equally within the 
county."109 The local option sales tax credit scheme, on the other 
hand, "has not altered the levying of property taxes nor the assess­
ment of property."110 Instead, the court concluded, "the scheme 
merely levies a sales tax and distributes the sales tax in the form of a 
property tax credit. "111 
The Westvaco court's conclusion is defensible only if one accepts 
the analytical premise that one should consider the "distribution" 
trial property, 6% of the fair market value of commercial property, and 4% of the fair mar­
ket value of owner-occupied residential property are to be placed on the tax rolls. See S.C. 
CoNST. art. X, § 1 (amended 1977). The relationship between these assessment ratios - 10.5 
to 6 to 4 - determines the relative tax burden that each class of property will bear. For 
example, if three parcels of industrial, commercial, and owner-occupied residential property 
were each worth $100,000, they would be placed on the tax rolls at $10,500, $6,000, and 
$4,000 respectively and, if the tax rate were 1 %, would bear taxes of $105, $60, and $40 
respectively. 
The property tax credit altered the relative property tax burden borne by each class of 
property. For example, if $100 of local option sales tax revenues were available to reduce 
property taxes and if the taxing district's property consisted solely of the three $100,000 par­
cels of industrial, commercial, and owner-occupied residential property described above, 
each parcel would receive a credit of $33.33. As a consequence, instead of bearing respective 
property taxes of $105, $60, and $40, in the constitutionally prescribed ratio of 10.5 to 6 to 4, 
the parcels would bear respective property taxes of $71.33, $26.67 and $6.67, in a ratio of 10.7 
to 4 to l. 
107. Westvaco, 461 S.E.2d at 741. 
108. 467 S.E.2d at 741. 
109. 467 S.E.2d at 741. 
110. 467 S.E.2d at 741. 
111. 467 S.E.2d at 741. 
June 1997] Suspect Linkage 2187 
of the local sales tax revenues in the form of a property tax credit 
independently of the property taxes that the credit reduced. The 
court, however, never adequately explained why it should not have 
viewed the two measures together for purposes of constitutional 
analysis. As to the "plain language" argument that the constitution 
imposed no textual limitation on the "distribution" of taxes but 
only on the "assessment of property," the court's position is under­
mined by the fact that there never was any "distribution" of taxes at 
all. Taxpayers simply received a property tax bill reduced by the 
amount of the credit. 
More fundamentally, the court never grappled with - or even 
acknowledged - the practical effect of the tax credit, which recon­
figured real-world property tax bills no less than would have an out­
right constitution-defying alteration in the relative assessment 
ratios of all property in the state.112 
Other courts faced with state constitutional challenges have dis­
played more sensitivity to these practical-effect concerns, taking an 
approach strikingly different from Westvaco. In State ex rel La 
Follette v. Torphy, 113 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of property tax credits provided to 
offset increased property tax assessments attributable to building 
improvements. The credits - which were funded out of the state's 
general treasury - were limited to owners of particular types of 
residential property that did not exceed a specified market value.114 
The state official charged with administering the credit scheme 
challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it violated 
Wisconsin's uniformity clause because it resulted in the imposition 
of unequal tax burdens_ on taxpayers who owned buildings of equal 
112. Tue assessment ratio is the percentage of fair market value at which property is 
placed on the tax rolls. As noted above, see supra note 106, the South Carolina Constitution 
explicitly prescribes these ratios for different classes of property. 
113. 270 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1978). 
114. See 270 N.W.2d at 188. It is worth noting that property taxes are imposed by local 
taxing jurisdictions. Consequently, the "credit" came in the form of an actual payment by the 
state - or a reduction in the taxpayer's state tax liability - rather than merely a reduction in 
the taxpayer's local property tax liability. For this reason Torphy seemed to present an even 
less appealing case for finding linkage than Westvaco. Although we might have characterized 
the payments involved in Torphy as "subsidies" equal to the taxpayer's local property tax 
liability, we have chosen to follow the state legislature's and court's characterization of the 
payments as "credits." As the court described the scheme: 
Tue law provides tax credits, within prescribed limitations, to certain property own­
ers for building and garage improvements which result in increased property tax assess­
ments. The statutes set forth the method of calculating the tax credit Tue tax credit, 
thus computed, is paid to the owner of the real estate by the state from the general 
revenue fund. 
270 N.W.2d at 188. 
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value. The state attorney general defended the credit, arguing that 
the uniformity clause was inapplicable because the credit was not 
part of a direct tax on real estate to which the uniformity clause 
applied but rather was an independent distribution of tax proceeds. 
He contended that "since each owner first pays the full property tax 
assessed and only later receives a credit from the state's general 
revenues, the tax burden of this property owner is not affected. "115 
The court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the 
property tax credit resulted in a violation of state uniformity stric­
tures. The court reasoned that "[i]t is the effect of the statute, not 
the form, which determines whether it is a tax statute subject to the 
uniformity clause."116 Although the statute provided for payment 
of the tax credit from general revenues, "it is in substance a tax 
statute because it has the effect of changing the individual tax bur­
den by granting a partial exemption."117 The fact that a credit was 
paid to some taxpayers and not to others led "to the indisputable 
conclusion that taxpayers owning equally valuable property will 
ultimately be paying disproportionate amounts of real estate 
taxes,"118 and "[t]his is not uniformity."119 
The contrast between Westvaco and Torphy is striking. Indeed, 
it seems clear that Westvaco would have come out differently had it 
been decided by the Wisconsin court and that Torphy would have 
come out differently had it been decided by the South Carolina 
court. The Wisconsin court presumably would have reasoned in 
Westvaco that the property tax credit, even though derived from 
sales tax proceeds, "is in substance a tax statute because it has the 
effect of changing the individual tax burden. "120 Accordingly, the 
credit would have failed to comport with the requirements of South 
Carolina's constitutionally based property tax classification scheme. 
In contrast, the South Carolina court presumably would have rea­
soned in Torphy that the provision of a property tax credit from 
general revenue sources does no violence to the constitutional 
requirement of uniformity in taxation because the constitution 
"does not impose uniformity on the distribution of taxes."121 The 
115. 270 N.W.2d at 190-91. 
116. 270 N.W .2d at 19 2. 
117. 270 N.W.2d at 19 2. 
118. 270 N.W. 2d at 19 2-93. 
119. 270 N.W.2d at 193. 
1 20. Torphy, 270 N.W.2d at 19 2; see also supra text accompanying note 111. 
1 21. Westvaco Corp. v. South Carolina Dept. of Revenue, 476 S.E. 2d 739, 741 {S. C. 1995) 
(per curiam); see also supra text accompanying note 107. 
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court would have tracked the analysis of the Wisconsin attorney 
general that "since each owner first pays the full property tax 
assessed and only later receives a credit from the state's general 
revenues, the tax burden of this property owner is not affected"122 
- at least not in a constitutional sense. 
The doctrinal problem pointed out by Westvaco and Torphy is 
not merely theoretical. In fact, a wide variety of state uniformity 
and equality cases raise the same linkage issue and reflect the same 
doctrinal dichotomy revealed by the South Carolina and Wisconsin 
cases.123 The most troublesome aspect of these decisions is not that 
they came out differently. Inconsistent precedents are common­
place in the law, and they simply may reflect the reality that differ­
ent courts possess different (but reasonable) views as to the proper 
resolution of particular issues. What is troublesome about these 
cases is that they offer almost no clue as to why they came out dif­
ferently. The courts have failed to indicate what it is that leads 
them to consider or not consider taxing and spending measures as 
linked for purposes of constitutional analysis. 
IV. T OWARD S A MORE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 
TO THE "LINKAGE" IS SUE 
In this final section, we undertake to fill the gaps in judicial 
analyses of tax discrimination issues under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, and state uni­
formity and equality provisions. By articulating a three-step meth­
odology built around specific criteria, we seek to offer guidance on 
whether taxing and spending measures should be analyzed together 
for purposes of both federal and state constitutional constraints on 
discriminatory state taxation. Before turning to our own methodol­
ogy, however, we consider and rej ect two other possible 
approaches. 
1 2 2. Torphy, 270 N.W. 2d at 190-91. 
1 23. Compare Baker v. Matheson, 607 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1979) (holding that a refund of 
property truces to renters and homeowners from state's general fund does not violate state's 
uniformity clause because the refund is not remission of property truces but merely appropria­
tion subject to relruced constitutional scrutiny) and State ex rel Harvey v. Morgan, 139 
N.W. 2d 585 (Wis. 1966) (holding that credit provided to property owners from state's general 
fund did not violate uniformity and equality requirements because credit was tied to individ­
ual's characteristics, not those of property, and was credit against income rather than prop­
erty truces) with State v. Armstrong, 53 P. 981, 983 (Utah 1898) (holding that statute creating 
abatement of truces for indigent and infirm trucpayers violates constitutional requirement of 
uniformity, even though abatement relieves trucpayer of true burden only after it has. been 
levied, because legislature may not "do indirectly that which could not be done directly"). 
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A. Other Possible Approaches 
1. Substance and Form 
[Vol. 95: 2167 
The root of the problem in the linkage cases lies in the tension 
they display between the rule of substance and the rule of form. 
Decisions that view taxing and spending measures together and 
invalidate them on the ground that they collectively violate some 
constitutional norm invariably look through the "form" of the sepa­
rate, individually valid measures to their combined, illicit "sub­
stance."124 Similarly, decisions that view taxing and spending 
measures individually and sustain them because of their independ­
ent validity invariably rely on the form in which the enactments are 
cast and do not accord legal significance to their combined net 
effect.125 
Identifying the core difficulty with the linkage cases as one of 
substance versus form might appear to offer a ready solution to the 
problems that they raise. After all, it is well established, especially 
in tax cases, that substance and not form should govern legal analy­
sis.126 The United States Supreme Court in adjudicating the consti­
tutionality of state tax cases has observed that "we must look 
through form and behind labels to substance,"127 and it has explic­
itly embraced an approach that "consider[ s] not the formal lan­
guage of the tax statute but rather its practical effect. "128 Thus the 
Court's contemporary state tax jurisprudence is grounded in "eco­
nomic realities,"129 wedded to "pragmatism,"130 disdainful of "for­
malism,"131 and contemptuous of "magic words or labels."132 From 
1 24. See, e.g., supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Torphy case); see 
also Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348, 1358 (Or.) (Gillette, J., dissenting) 
(" Substance counts; labels do not."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995). 
1 25. See, e.g., supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing Ragsdale decision). 
1 26. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 57 2-73 (1978) ("In applying 
this doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities 
of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed."); Helvering v. F. & 
R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 25 2, 255 (1939) ("In the field of taxation, administrators of the 
laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written docu­
ments are not rigidly binding."). 
1 27. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of Am., 355 U.S. 489, 49 2 (1958). 
1 28. Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 183 (1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 
(1977)); see also Nippert v. City of Richmond, 3 27 U.S. 416, 431 (1946) ("Not the tax in a 
vacuum of words, but its practical consequences . . •  are our concern."). 
1 29. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279. 
130. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992). 
131. Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 498 U. S. 358, 373 (1991). 
13 2. Qui/� 504 U.S. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Railway Express 
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959)). 
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these many authorities, it might seem to follow easily that linkage 
cases should simply tum on whether the challenged payment in sub­
stance replicates discriminatory tax relief. 
The difficulty with this "solution" to the linkage problem, how­
ever, is twofold. · First, even if one eschews form for substance, it is 
not always clear what constitutes form and what constitutes sub­
stance. Is it merely a matter of form, for example, that a taxing 
measure and a spending measure were embodied in separate pieces 
of legislation, took different routes through the legislative process, 
and were enacted in separate legislative sessions? If so, is there a 
point at which such "formal" differences between taxing and spend­
ing measures rise to the level of substance? If Alaska imposes an 
income tax on residents and nonresidents, can it increase its 
Permanent Fund dividend paid to residents without violating the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause? Or will the dividend result in a 
constitutional violation on the theory that Alaska has reduced resi­
dents' effective income tax liabilities and thereby "in substance" 
imposed a discriminatory income tax on nonresidents?133 Does the 
timing of the increase matter? Does the amount of the increase 
matter? Does it matter whether the dividend is a percentage of the 
resident's tax bill? Does it matter whether the increased dividend 
offsets in toto the tax bills of all (or most or many) state residents? 
In short, are these matters of substance or of form? 
Second, despite the oft-uttered injunction that substance should 
prevail over form, courts - including the Supreme Court - fre­
quently have concluded that form can and should play a key role in 
resolving state tax controversies.134 In Oklahoma Tax Commission 
v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,135 for example, the Court sustained against a 
challenge under the Commerce Clause a "sales tax" measured by 
the unapportioned gross proceeds from interstate transportation; at 
the same time the Court reaffirmed an earlier decision invalidating 
an economically identical "gross receipts tax" measured by the 
133. The example in the text borrows from the recent suggestion of Jay Hammond, 
Alaska's governor from 1975 through 198 2, that the state impose an income tax on state 
residents and nonresidents, accompanied by an increase in the Permanent Fund dividend to 
state residents, in order to neutralize the effect of the income tax on Alaskans. See Former 
Governor Calls for Nation's Highest Income Tax, 10 STATE TAX NOTES 185 2 (1996). 
134. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 n.6 (1983) (stating that in cases involv­
ing tax relief said impermissibly to aid religious schools, " 'the form of the [State's assistance 
• • •  must be examined] for the light it casts on the substance"' (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 60 2, 614 (1971)), and that "[t]he fact that the Minnesota plan embodies a 'genuine 
tax deduction' is thus of some relevance" even though "the economic consequences of the 
program in Nyquist and that in this case may be difficult to distinguish"). 
135. 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
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unapportioned gross proceeds from interstate transportation.136 
The Court's decision in Jefferson Lines rested squarely on formal 
differences between a "sales tax," which is imposed on the pur­
chaser, and a "gross receipts tax," which·is imposed on the seller.131 
While recognizing a general hostility to "the adoption of purely for­
mal distinctions," the Court nevertheless observed that "economic 
equivalence alone has . . .  not been (and should not be) the touch­
stone of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. "138 
Likewise, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,139 the Court adopted 
a "bright-line rule" that requires an out-of-state vendor to collect 
sales and use taxes only if the vendor is physically present in the 
taxing state.140 This test was admittedly formalistic, for it immu­
nized even large, sophisticated mail-order sellers with millions of 
dollars of local sales from any obligation to collect the state's use 
tax, while imposing a collection obligation on small, Mom-and-Pop 
retailers that happened to send a salesman into the state. As the 
Court declared, however, "not all formalism is alike."141 While 
some formal distinctions may serve no valid constitutional purpose, 
the formalistic, bright-line rule approved in Quill "furthers the ends 
of the dormant Commerce Clause":142 It avoids burdens on inter­
state commerce "by the demarcation of a discrete realm of com­
mercial activity that is free from interstate taxation,"143 and it 
"encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters invest­
ment by businesses an� individuals."144 
136. 514 U.S. at 189-90 (reaffirming Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 
653 {1948)). 
137. 514 U.S. at 190. See generally Walter Hellerstein et al., Commerce Clause Restraints 
on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REv. 47 {1995). 
138. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 196 n.7. 
139. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
140. 504 U.S. at 316. 
141. 504 U.S. at 314. 
142. 504 U.S. at 314. 
143. 504 U.S. at 315. 
144. 504 U.S. at 316. In a similar vein, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw 
Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2221 {1995), the Court was unwilling "to make 'economic reality' our 
guide" for determining the validity of state taxes on Indians. Instead, the Court endorsed a 
more formalistic approach to the issue under which the "legal incidence" of the tax deter­
mined whether it fell on Indians for constitutional purposes. The Court observed that "a 
'legal incidence' test • • .  'provide[s] a reasonably bright-line standard which, from a tax 
administration perspective, responds to the need for substantial certainty as to the permissi­
ble scope of state taxation authority."' 115 S. Ct. at 2221 {alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). Legal incidence also has played a critical role in determining when state taxes that 
touch federal government operations run afoul of the intergovernmental tax immunity rule. 
See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 104, lj[ 22.02[2]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
.AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-30 to -32 {2d ed. 1988). 
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In sum, while superficially attractive, the notion that linkage 
issues should be resolved by letting substance govern form provides 
no easy solution to this set of problems. First, it fails to provide a 
workable test for distinguishing valid from invalid taxing and 
spending schemes, since the line between substance and form is 
ambiguous. Second, a mechanical subordination of form to func­
tion cannot be squared with a deeply rooted judicial respect for 
form that coexists - albeit uneasily - with courts' commitment to 
resolving these issues on the basis of substance. If we are to 
develop an approach to the linkage issue that not only improves 
upon what courts have been doing but also offers them an alterna­
tive that they will find acceptable, we cannot merely mouth the 
platitude that, in these matters, substance governs form. 
2. Motive-Based Analysis 
Another approach to linkage cases would call on courts to frame 
their inquiries in terms of legislative motive. In particular, courts 
might make linkage decisions tum upon the answer to a single 
question: Did the state adopt its discriminatory spending program 
with the specific intent of offsetting or mitigating obligations to pay 
a state tax? The majority in Sheehy appeared to adopt this sort of 
purposive approach.145 We, however, would reject it for three sepa­
rate reasons. 
First, any such approach will suffer from the same maladies that 
mark all motive-driven rules - problems of discovering and weigh­
ing evidence of motive, of characterizing motives, and of dealing 
with the multiple motives that often together trigger government 
action.146 These problems, moreover, are particularly acute in this 
145. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 
146. Tue seminal treatments of this subject include John Hart Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970), and Paul Brest, 
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 
1971 SUP. Cr. REv. 95. See also Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 
925 (1978). For useful commentaries on this question by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Commn., 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) 
("What motivates one legislator to vote for a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores 
of others to enact it."); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 702-03 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing flaws in assuming "that individual legislators are motivated 
by one discernible 'actual' purpose" and noting that "different legislators may vote for a 
single piece of legislation for widely different reasons"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 383-84 (1968) (noting that purpose-driven inquiries "are a hazardous matter," in part, 
because results may tum on "what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said"). See also 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 268 
n.18 (1977) (observing that "judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation repre­
sent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government"). See gener­
ally Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937) (noting that "motives alone will 
seldom, if ever, invalidate a tax that apart from its motives would be recognized as lawful"). 
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setting because spending decisions are almost never made by a sin­
gle administrator or a small body of agency officials whose motives 
may be discrete and identifiable. Instead, spending decisions typi­
cally are made, often after elaborate political posturing, by the state 
legislature itself.147 
Second, we doubt that a tax-reducing motive by itself, even if 
discoverable, always should establish linkage for purposes of consti­
tutional tax discrimination rules. The court in Ragsdale, for exam­
ple, explicitly rejected this position,148 and there is reason to believe 
it was on firm ground in doing so. In particular, the United States 
Supreme Court has built important constitutional doctrines around 
the notion that in-state taxpayers should be able to reap where they 
have sown by redirecting to favored state residents the proceeds of 
state tax collections.149 It may well follow that the state should be 
able to channel benefits to groups of its own residents it could not 
favor with discriminatory taxes, even if the state is responding in 
part to demands for tax relief. 
Third and most important, we would eschew a purpose-based 
test because we believe a more objective, more workable, and more 
just approach exists. The remainder of this article develops that 
approach. We turn now to detailing its structure and impli­
cations. 
147. We recognize, of course, that the Supreme Court has required inquiries into govern­
mental motives in a variety of settings, see generally TRIBE, supra note 144, § 5-3, at 303 n.10 
(collecting illustrations), and that it has observed in particular that, for purposes of the dor­
mant Commerce Clause, a fatal finding of economic protectionism may rest "on proof either 
of discriminatory effect . . . or of discriminatory purpose," Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981). The inquiry into whether a particular law is 
discriminatory because of its underlying purpose, however, must be distinguished from the 
inquiry whether the legislature's purpose requires viewing ostensibly separated taxing and 
spending measures as inextricably connected for purposes of discrimination analysis. 
148. See Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348, 1356 {Or.) ("The state is 
entitled to raise the level of taxable compensation of its employees, for whatever reason, 
including to compensate them for a change in the tax laws that results in a decreased level of 
net after-tax income"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 569 {1995). 
149. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 
221 (1984) (noting that the "fact that [the city] is expending its own funds . . •  is certainly a 
factor - perhaps the crucial factor - to be considered in evaluating [the constitutionality of 
discrimination against nonresidents]"); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employ­
ers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214 (1983) (upholding municipal hiring preference on projects for 
which "the city expended only its own funds"); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 {1980) 
(defending market-participant exception to dormant Commerce Clause in part on the ground 
that state may channel state benefits to residents of the state supplying them). 
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B. The Criteria of Linkage 
1. Basic Principles 
2195 
Life and law are too ·complex to permit identification of one 
simple test by which courts can assess the existence (or nonexis­
tence) of a cognizable linkage between taxing and spending meas­
ures. A more fruitful approach to the problem calls for the 
recognition that there are a number of criteria that ought to inform 
a court's determination as to whether it should treat a trucing provi­
sion and a purportedly independent spending measure as an inte­
grated whole. In our view, these criteria have in fact influenced 
courts when they have determined that trucing and spending meas­
ures should be treated as linked, even though the courts often have 
failed to articulate that they are using these criteria in making that 
determination. By systematically identifying the criteria that ought 
to inform judicial decisionmaking in this area and by detailing how 
those criteria properly interact, we seek to provide a framework for 
a more reasoned approach to linkage issues than is discoverable in 
the existing case law. 
While the remainder of this article develops these matters in 
detail, we offer now the essential guideposts of analysis. First, in 
our view, the results in linkage cases typically should hinge on the 
operation of five identifiable factors. We refer to these factors as 
(a) internalization, (b) simultaneity, (c) scope, (d) correlation, and 
( e) policy responsiveness. In our view, the first four of these factors 
differ from the fifth in that they are equally applicable in all linkage 
cases and, at least in their strongest manifestations, are subject to 
ready and objective identification. We shall explain in short order 
what each of these five key terms denotes. 
Second, our inspection of and reflection on this body of cases 
convinces us that courts ought to extract - and, as a practical mat­
ter, already have extracted to a large extent - from these criteria 
three key principles. These principles - which we shall elaborate 
on in due course - may be summarized as follows: 
Principle #1 (the virtually per se internalization rule): In the area of 
tax credits and exemptions, whenever the state legislature internalizes 
an alleged "payment" to a particular tax - in the sense that the credit 
directly serves to reduce that very tax - a "virtually per se rule"1so 
operates to establish linkage. The determinative linking factor in New 
150. We borrow the term "virtually per se rule" from City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). We recognize, of course, that the term was used in a very different 
context in that case, but we employ it here because we think it best captures the nature of the 
very strong principle we mean to describe. 
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Energy, for example, lay in the state's decision to reduce the fuel tax 
obligations of members of the favored group - sellers of locally pro­
duced ethanol - by granting them credit against that very tax.151 
Principle #2 (the twin-indicia rule of thumb): In the area of outright 
payments, the internalization rule cannot operate because, as we shall 
see, internalization cannot be present by definition.152 Likewise, 
internalization is absent in some cases that involve tax credits and 
exemptions.153 In many "noninternalization" cases, however, linkage 
is present, although it is not always easy to decide when. We believe, 
however, that application of a rule of thumb will greatly aid the pro­
cess of decision. This rule stipulates that a strong presumption of 
linkage exists when two of our three "objective" linkage factors other 
than internalization - that is, simultaneity, correlation, and scope -
are present in a strong sense. We shall explain in short order what we 
mean by "a strong sense," particularly with respect to correlation, 
which constitutes the least objectifiable of these three criteria. 
Principle #3 (the five-factor mode of analysis): In all other cases (that 
is, in all cases not covered by either Principle #1 or Principle #2), 
courts should consider all five linking factors in deciding whether to 
treat the taxing measure and the spending measure as parts of an 
inseparable whole. This mode of analysis is not as open ended and 
manipulable as this shorthand description of the principle might sug­
gest. Rather, as we shall soon see, existing authorities and articulable 
principles will constrain judicial excesses as courts confront this most 
complicated set of linkage cases. 
A good place to start in assessing and applying this methodology is 
with the easiest case. After looking at that case - and developing 
in that context the essential features of our five key linkage factors 
- we turn to cases that present more difficult and interesting con­
stitutional linkage issues. 
2. The Paradigmatic Case 
If there is a paradigmatic case of constitutionally linked taxing 
and spending measures, it is the case of the tax credit or exemption 
enacted along with and exactly offsetting the underlying tax in such 
a way as to disfavor all and only members of a constitutionally pro­
tected group.1s4 No one would seriously defend, for example, a 
151. For a discussion of New Energy, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
152. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. 
153. See infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text. 
154. One might question whether a tax exemption should be viewed as a "spending" 
measure at all. One could say that the imposition of a tax along with an exemption simply 
amounts to the enactment of a tax on the class of taxpayers not qualifying for the exemption. 
Accordingly, one could argue that the tax should be struck down as discriminatory without 
further inquiry as to whether a spending measure is linked to a taxing measure, assuming the 
class of taxpayers upon which the tax has been imposed has a right not to be subjected to 
discriminatory taxes. 
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nondiscriminatory tax imposed on residents and nonresidents alike, 
but coupled with a credit or exemption, provided only to residents, 
that exactly neutralizes the tax. Even though the tax would pass 
muster standing alone,155 artd' even though a state spending mea­
sure limited solely to favored residents presumably would pass mus­
ter too,156 courts would invalidate the tax-and-credit or tax-and­
exemption scheme described above. They would reason that such a 
program in substance amounts to a tax imposed solely on non­
residents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.157 
How do we know that a state tax and a credit or exemption of 
the type described above are invidiously linked? The answer is that 
they display all of the key indicia of linkage that justify treating 
them as a single measure. To use our terms, the challenged scheme 
involves internalization, simultaneity, scope, correlation, and policy 
responsiveness. Indeed, each of these key linkage factors is present 
in a strong and unmistakable sense. 
a. Internalization. In our paradigmatic case, strong internaliza­
tion is present because the credit or exemption defended as an 
independent payment measure reduces the challenged tax qua tax. 
Our paradigmatic case does not involve any outright payment made 
to the taxpayer. It also does not involve a credit against a tax based 
on payment of some other tax - as would exist, for example, if the 
state afforded a class of persons a credit against state real property 
taxes for state income tax payments made within the prior year. 
Instead, the alleged payment, made by way of the credit or exemp­
tion, is internalized in the pure sense that the legislature itself has 
While we do not necessarily disagree with this suggestion, we nevertheless have included 
exemptions along with credits in this discussion for four reasons. First, some would argue 
that tax exemptions should in fact be viewed as a form of governmental expenditures. See, 
e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDlTIJRES 212-13 (1985). Sec­
ond, tax exemptions seem a proper subject of discussion because their economic effect is so 
clearly comparable to government actions that more clearly involve governmental "spend­
ing" - e.g., tax credits, tax rebates, and subsidies. Third, some of the relevant cases involve 
both credits and exemptions without distinguishing between the two. See, e.g., Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 192-98. Finally, 
the benefits of including exemptions in the discussion appear to us to outweigh the draw­
backs. Specifically, at the risk of making our discussion slightly overinclusive - and, as 
noted above, there are those who would argue that we are doing no such thing - we are able 
to draw on the insights of cases involving taxes and exemptions as well those involving taxes 
and measures that are more invariably viewed as involving governmental spending. 
155. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
156. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65, 67-68 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] state 
may make residence within its boundaries more attractive by offering direct benefits to its 
citizens in the form of . • •  direct distributions of its munificence."). 
157. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (invalidating under Privi­
leges and Immunities Clause facially neutral tax on the income of interstate commuters that 
effectively fell exclusively on nonresidents due to exemptions from the tax). 
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structured that payment as a method of directly reducing the obli­
gation to pay the single, particular tax against which the credit or 
exemption operates. 
Most tax credits and exemptions work in this way, and in all 
such cases strong internalization is present. When, in contrast, the 
state credits one tax against another - as in our income-tax/prop­
erty-tax hypothetical - we would say that only weak internaliza­
tion exists.158 And when the state does not purport to grant tax 
relief at all, but instead makes outright payments, we would say, 
except in cases involving true tax rebates, 159 that there is no inter­
nalization at all. 
b. Simultaneity. Simultaneity also is present in our paradig­
matic case, and it serves three linkage functions. First, simultaneity 
- like internalization - gives rise to a connection between the tax 
and spending measures simply as a matter of form. As we have 
seen, though considerations of form have their limits, they can and 
do count for something in constitutional tax cases.160 Second, 
simultaneity is strongly suggestive of a legislative purpose to have 
the spending program offset the tax in a manner functionally akin 
to the sort of credit or exemption that gives rise to internalization. 
We previously have explained why proof of such a motive should 
not be all important for purposes of linkage analysis;161 to make 
that observation, however, is not to say that legislative motives -
when objectively evidenced - should count for nothing at all. 
Third, simultaneity may well distort political processes in a way that 
raises particular risks of factional overreaching. The majority in 
West Lynn Creamery focused on this point, 162 and we believe it was 
on solid ground in doing so.163 
158. An illustrative case that involves weak internalization is Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U.S. 725 (1981), which we discuss infra at notes 192-98 and accompanying text. 
159. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 124-44 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
163. 1\vo recent cases in which simultaneity appeared to play a key role are Zenith/ 
Kremer Waste Systems, Inc. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary District, 558 N.W.2d 288 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 26T (Minn. Mar. 27, 1997) and 
Sanifin Inc. v. Kandiyohi County, 559 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). In each case, a 
public waste-processing facility charged high tipping fees. When a major hauler of local 
waste announced plans to discontinue use of the facility and haul materials out of state, the 
public facility operator: (1) imposed a charge on all waste generated within the waste facility 
district; (2) directed that a portion of the resulting revenue be used to pay for the operation 
of the waste facility; and (3) reduced tipping fees. The consequence of these actions was that 
persons who hauled waste out of state continued to pay full tipping fees plus the new in·state 
waste charge, while persons who hauled waste to the local facility paid the new waste charge 
but also paid lower tipping fees attributable to that charge. In each case, the court found a 
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Simultaneity, like internalization, is an objectively identifiable 
trait that should generally be readily recognizable by courts. Occa­
sionally, however, judges will have to struggle with this factor, for 
literal simultaneity should not be required to bring the factor into 
play; substantial simultaneity - like substantial performance in the 
law of contracts164 - ought to suffice for this purpose. But in most 
cases simultaneity clearly is or is not present, particularly because in 
most cases that do involve simultaneity, the state will have adopted 
the challenged taxing and spending measures as part of the same 
legislative program.165 Such is the situation in our paradigmatic 
case. 
c. Scope. A third linkage factor - what we call "scope" -
concerns the relationship between the class of taxpayers, the class 
of payment beneficiaries, and the class of persons protected by the 
operative constitutional rule. In our paradigmatic case, for exam­
ple, the scope factor operates in its strongest form because the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause guards against discrimination 
between residents and nonresidents,166 and the tax exemption or 
credit afforded by the state covers all, but only, those state residents 
subject to the tax. Such a payment, in our nomenclature, is univer­
sal in scope. 
The subject of scope, in its details, is marked by some complex­
ity. Some spending measures are under-universal in scope.167 
Commerce Clause violation because "the combination of the service fee and the tipping fee 
would be discriminatory in its effect." Sanifil� 559 N.W.2d at 116. Notably, the general 
waste charge and the tipping fee reduction were not adopted with literal simultaneity in 
Zenith/Kremer although (1) they had the same effective date, and (2) adoption of the charge 
came under consideration "[a]t the same time" the fee reduction was announced. Zenith/ 
Kremer, 558 N.W.2d at 290. Drawing on West Lynn Creamery, the court in Zenith/Kremer 
found a constitutional violation because "[h]aulers to out·Of·state landfills pay the entire 
management fee, but do not receive the 'rebate' that haulers to the Facility receive through 
the Facility's reduced tipping fee." 558 N.W.2d at 291. 
164. See generally E. Au.AN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 8.12 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing 
substantial performance as a means to avoid forfeiture). 
165. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), discussed supra 
notes 21-41 and accompanying text. 
166. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
167. In our paradigmatic case, for example, there was a perfect universality of scope 
because relief from the tax was afforded only to the class that was forbidden by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause from being favored - i.e., only to state residents - and relief was 
afforded to all members of that class - i.e., to all state residents. Many tax credits and 
exemptions (and other forms of spending), however, are under-universal with respect to 
scope. For example, the credit in New Energy, discussed supra notes 16-20 and accompany­
ing text, was under-universal because all in-state sellers and producers of vehicle fuel other 
than gasohol continued to bear the brunt of the tax. In our view, under-universality of scope 
should cut against a finding of linkage. See infra note 170. 
2200 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2167 
Others are over-universal.168 Spending measures can be over­
universal in different respects.169 And some spending measures are 
both under- and over-universal, and over-universal in different 
ways.170 These varying forms of scope will matter in deciding actual 
cases and will be touched upon further in our later discussions. 
d. Correlation. Correlation differs from internalization, simul­
taneity, and scope because - as we use the term - it embraces 
several different forms of connectedness between trucing and spend­
ing measures. In particular, a spending measure may link up with a 
trucing measure by way of (1) durational correlation, which is pres­
ent when the payment measure is to operate only for as long as the 
challenged tax; (2) computational correlation, which is present 
when tax obligations and subsidy payments bear a significant math­
ematical relationship, as when both are computed as a stated per­
centage of gross receipts; and (3) source-based correlation, which is 
168. The New Energy case reveals a type of overuniversality that we might - because it 
is a Commerce Clause case - call "interstate overuniversality." This label fits because New 
Energy involved a credit afforded both to members of the not-to-be-favored class of dealers 
in intrastate fuel and - because of the statute's reciprocity provision - to some members of 
the protected class of dealers in interstate fuel. It can be argued that this sort of overuniver­
sality strengthens the case for linkage on the ground that if X equals linkage (with X consti­
tuting universal coverage as we have defined it), then a fortiori so should X plus Y. On the 
other hand, it may be that this form of overinclusiveness weakens the case for linkage 
because it reduces the extent of discrimination and lessens the resemblance of the overall 
trucing-and-spending scheme to a protective tariff. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 15, 
at 846-48. Our sense is that interstate overuniversal scope probably should be treated as 
involving substantial universality for purposes of the presumption established by our 
Principle #2, although there is room for disagreement on this point. At the least, however, 
we believe that interstate overuniversality should not weigh against linkage when, as in New 
Energy itself, the interstate overuniversality results from a reciprocity provision. Such provi­
sions, after all, simply put a group of states in the same discriminatory posture that a single 
state cannot occupy. 
169. Just as a spending measure may be marked by interstate overuniversality, see supra 
note 168, it may be marked as well by intrastate overuniversality. Assume, for example, that 
the fuel tax involved in New Energy was enacted simultaneously with an outright subsidy 
program for sellers of all locally produced com products, including locally produced ethanol 
(as well as sellers of products from subsidy-reciprocating states). The grant of the subsidy to 
sellers of locally produced com products other than ethanol - for example, locally produced 
com meal or com chowder - would establish the payment program's intrastate over­
universality vis-a-vis the motor fuel tax. One can argue that the scope factor serves less well 
to link this subsidy to the Ohio fuel tax than to link the actual credit involved in New Energy 
to that tax. After all, what does com chowder or com meal have to do with fuel and its 
taxation? On the other hand, intrastate overuniversality is problematic from a political-pro­
cess perspective - and thus supportive of the case for linkage - because, at least if there is 
simultaneity, it multiplies the number of in-state interests prepared to push for enactment of 
a potentially overreaching tax. For this reason, we believe that intrastate overuniversality 
should at least count for more than interstate overuniversality in tying together taxing and 
spending measures. 
170. Indeed, our hypothetical com products subsidy case involves underuniversality 
(because sellers of local fuel products other than ethanol remain taxed), interstate over­
universality (because of the reciprocity provision) and intrastate overuniversality (because 
the subsidy extends to such subjects as com chowder and com meal). 
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present when the state sets aside some or all of the proceeds of the 
challenged tax itself to fund its payment program, or calculates total 
payments as a function of tax receipts. 
When we apply each of these correlation criteria to our paradig­
matic case, we see that it presents the very strongest form of corre­
lation. There is durational correlation because any exemption or 
credit from a tax by definition can last only as long as does the tax. 
There is computational correlation because the credit or exemption 
offsets exactly, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the tax bill the benefici­
ary otherwise would pay. And, at least in effect, there is source­
based correlation too. If the state, for example, provided for 
rebates of the very payments favored taxpayers had made, source­
based correlation would clearly exist. Should we not conclude a 
fortiori that source-based correlation exists when, instead of going 
through the gyrations of collecting and returning tax money, the 
state simply affords credits or exemptions from the challenged tax? 
We think so. 
It bears emphasis that declaring the presence of strong correla­
tion often will involve a greater exercise of discretionary judgment 
than finding internalization, simultaneity, or universality of scope. 
This is because the existence of correlation is not simply an "on-off" 
matter. Indeed, the very fact that there are multiple indicia of cor­
relation, some or all of which may be present in a given case, 
reveals that finding correlation means choosing a place on a contin­
uum. At the same time, in many cases it will be clear that a strong 
correlation exists. In particular, we believe that such correlation 
almost always marks the case when two of the three forms of corre­
lation (that is, durational, computational, and source-based) are 
present. 
e. Policy Responsiveness. The final linkage factor - what we 
call "policy responsiveness" - calls on courts to ask whether the 
challenged state program raises distinctive concerns in light of the 
policies that drive the particular tax discrimination doctrine at issue. 
In our paradigmatic case, for example, we believe that a distinctive 
and important policy concern, rooted in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, supports the argument for finding linkage. 
The argument for finding linkage derives force from the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause's underlying purpose of weaving 
the nation together by directly "tying the fate" of out-of-state resi-
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dents to the state's treatment of its own residents.111 This policy 
concern is triggered whenever there is simultaneity and universality 
of scope. Simultaneity is significant because it is the contemporane­
ous enactment of the tax and one offsetting "payment" that permits 
the resident-favoring discrimination to take hold. Put another way, 
if the state were forced first to enact a neutral nondiscriminatory 
tax - and only later permitted to consider whether to adopt an 
exemption - the close tying of the fates of residents and non­
residents with respect to the tax suggests that the tax would not be 
enacted in the first place. Likewise, whenever there is perfect 
universality of scope the risk of oppression is heightened because 
not a single resident will be directly disadvantaged by the tax and 
thus stand ready to serve as a surrogate protector of nonresidents' 
interests. It follows that even if a state tax is narrow in its coverage 
- in that, for example, it applies only to members of a particular 
profession - an exemption that favors all residents subject to the 
tax creates a particularly grave danger of illicit overreaching.112 In 
our paradigmatic case, however, this concern about overreaching is 
triggered in an additional and particularly significant way. 
Why? Because our hypothetical statute places a tax on all per­
sons - not just some subclass of persons - and affords an offset­
ting credit or exemption to every single resident of the state. In 
such a case, the ordinary counterweight to enactment of an unwor­
thy state spending program - namely, the natural opposition 
directed to it by voters who do not enjoy its benefits - cannot pos­
sibly operate because all voters in the state benefit from the spend­
ing program. In other words, the genuinely global reach of the 
spending component of the state's program in our paradigmatic 
case serves to ensure the total absence of surrogate representation 
by in-state residents of the interests of burdened outsiders. In these 
circumstances, the policy that supports the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause stands uniquely at risk. Thus, the factor we call 
"policy responsiveness" cuts in favor of finding linkage.173 
f. Conclusion. This analysis of our paradigm introduces the fac­
tors that should drive linkage analysis in tax-discrimination cases. 
171. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83 (1980) ("[B]y constitu­
tionally tying the fate of outsiders to the fate of those possessing political power, the framers 
insured that their interests would be well looked after."). 
172. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871) (invalidating differing license 
fees imposed on resident and nonresident sellers of goods). 
173. See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1920) (distinguishing tax 
that presents "a case of occasional or accidental inequality" from "a general rule, operating 
to the disadvantage of all non-residents • • •  and favoring all residents"). 
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In virtually no real-world case will all five linkage factors be pres­
ent. In many real-world cases, however, courts will find linkage 
and, indeed, must do so under the teaching of existing authorities. 
We turn now to those authorities and to the application of our ana­
lytical structure both to them and to other cases. We begin with 
cases involving tax credits and exemptions. We turn thereafter to 
cases involving outright government payments. We look finally at 
cases involving another related problem: the imposition of a new 
tax at the same time an old one is repealed or restructured. 
3. Credits and Exemptions 
a. Credits, Exemptions, and the Virtually Per Se Rule. The first 
type of case that raises linkage issues involves the tax credit or 
exemption. We saw in our paradigmatic case how one form of 
credit or exemption was marked by a fatal linkage. When we relax 
the conditions of our paradigm in a credit or exemption case, con­
stitutional problems persist. The inquiry, however, becomes more 
complex. 
Consider New Energy Co. v. Limbach.174 In that case, Ohio 
provided a credit against the state's motor fuel tax for each gallon 
of ethanol sold as a component of gasohol. The credit was limited, 
however, to ethanol produced in Ohio or in a state that granted 
similar tax benefits to Ohio-produced ethanol. The Court, viewing 
the tax and the tax credit together, concluded that "[t]he Ohio pro­
vision at issue . . .  explicitly deprives certain proqucts of generally 
available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain 
other States, and thus on its face appears to violate the cardinal 
requirement of nondiscrimination."11s 
New Energy, however, did not present all of the indicia of 
linkage present in our paradigmatic case. In particular, when the 
legislature adopted the limited ethanol credit, the underlying fuel 
tax against which the credit operated had been in effect for years.176 
Hence, the important linkage factor that we call simultaneity was 
not present in the New Energy case. In addition, the ethanol credit 
- which by its terms benefited sellers of fuel only to the extent that 
they sold gasohol - favored only some of the in-state interests bur-
174. 486 U.S. 269 {1988). We discussed New Energy briefly at supra notes 16-20 and 
accompanying text. 
175. 486 U.S. at 274. 
176. See 486 U.S. at 272 (noting that the original sales tax exemption was nondiscrimina­
tory, but that the exemption was amended three years later to limit benefits to sellers of local 
and reciprocity-protected ethanol). 
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dened by the underlying fuel tax. The exemption thus lacked 
universality of scope.111 
The critical message of the New Energy case is that the Court 
was prepared to, and did, strike down the discriminatory exemption 
despite the absence of simultaneity and scope. Perhaps the Court 
was influenced by the fact that as aggregate fuel tax liability rose for 
ethanol sellers, so too did the credit. For this reason, the taxing 
scheme in New Energy was marked by the linkage characteristic we 
call correlation. In reality, however, we doubt that the presence of 
correlation was key to the result in New Energy, and in fact the 
Court never mentioned this factor in analyzing the case. Thus, for 
example, if Ohio had provided a fiat fuel tax credit - say, $1000 
per year - to all sellers of locally produced ethanol, regardless of 
quantities sold, we believe the Court would have reached the same 
result. 
The reason is that both the actual credit involved in New Energy 
and our hypothetical $1000-per-year credit share a linkage factor so 
important that it will be dispositive in most tax-credit and tax­
exemption cases: the factor we call internalization. This factor was 
present in New Energy - as it is in most cases involving credits or 
exemptions - because the credit explicitly reduced the tax qua tax. 
When the legislature itself thus internally ties its "spending" deci­
sion to a specific taxing measure, courts should accede to the legis­
lature's own formulation and decline to treat the two state actions 
as analytically severable. 
Before leaving the virtually per se internalization rule, we offer 
three refinements. First, the principle operates not only in cases 
that involve exemptions or credits, but also, for example, in cases 
that involve tax deductions.178 Even more significantly, we would 
apply the principle in cases involving true tax rebates - that is, 
state payments that are tax rebates in the strict sense that the state 
returns to a taxpayer some or all of the very payment that taxpayer 
already has made. Such a case, in our view, is in substance the same 
as one that involves a credit or exemption. More important, our 
nation's highest tribunal already has reached that conclusion.119 
177. See supra notes 167-68. 
178. Cf. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Fin., 643 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. 
Ct. 1995) (finding that limiting favorable depreciation deduction to investments in in-state 
property violates Commerce Clause); Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 
[1990-1993 Transfer Binder Wis.] St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 1 203-396 (Wis. Tax App. Commn. 
Feb. 24, 1993) (same). 
179. As Justice Stevens put it in West Lynn Creamery, "[i]t is obvious that the result in 
Bacchus would have been the same if instead of exempting certain Hawaiian liquors from 
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Second, we note that the establishment of linkage by way of 
internalization - or, for that matter, in any way at all - does not 
necessarily establish unlawful tax discrimination. Indeed, large 
numbers of credits or exemptions - even though they are "linked " 
to a particular tax - do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, 
because they do not discriminate against interstate commerce.180 
Moreover, some credits or exemptions that appear at first blush to 
be discriminatory tum out not to be discriminatory in an unconsti­
tutional way. We have argued elsewhere, for example, that tax 
credits or exemptions given with respect to property or sales taxes 
for businesses that locate operations within a state often should sur­
vive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny despite their superficially 
discriminatory cast.181 In short, the question of linkage is not the 
same as the question of unlawful discrimination. 
Third, we emphasize that our internalization-based virtually per 
se rule is just that: a virtually per se rule. Thus in proper cases the 
presumption it establishes may be overcome.182 The most obvious 
case of this sort would involve a legal text that specifically displaces 
otherwise operative linkage rules. A state constitution's uniformity 
provision, for example, could contain a proviso that stated: "In no 
circumstance shall any exemption or credit be considered along 
with the tax itself in making uniformity determinations. " Although 
such a proviso would be offbeat, its terms would bind the courts. 
Was such a provision, in effect, at work in the Westvaco case? 
We think not. The argument in that case that the Constitution 
imposed no textual limitation on the "distribution " of taxes but 
only on the "assessment of property " .fell fiat because in Westvaco 
there never was any "distribution " of taxes. Taxpayers simply 
received a property tax bill reduced by the amount of the credit.183 
Had the South Carolina Supreme Court been confronted with 
the facts of the Torphy case, however, the argument against linkage 
might have won the day because of the language of the South 
tax, Hawaii had rebated tbe amount of tax collected from tbe sale of those liquors." 512 U.S. 
186, 197 (1994). Stated more bluntly, "a discriminatory tax rebate is unconstitutional." 512 
U.S. at 197; see also Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348, 1356 (Or.) (stating, 
following Supreme Court's decision in Davis, "[a] tax rebate . . .  program only for state 
employees clearly would be impermissible"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995). 
180. This was tbe case, for example, with the general exemption of ethanol sales involved 
in New Energy prior to the statute's amendment in 1984. See 486 U.S. at 272. 
181. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 15, at 825-34. 
182. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (finding dormant Commerce Clause virtu­
ally per se rule overridden on facts presented). 
183. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
2206 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2167 
Carolina Constitution, even if internalization was present.184 In 
Torphy, it will be recalled, 1ss the tax credit received by property 
owners was not an actual reduction in their local property tax bill 
(as it was in Westvaco) but rather a payment to the taxpayer by the 
state. Because the payment was "integrated to the property tax 
process,"186 the Torphy court reasonably could conclude, as it did, 
that the taxing and spending measures together violated 
WISconsin's constitutional requirement that "[t]he rule of taxation 
shall be uniform."187 But it does not ineluctably follow that the 
payment would violate South Carolina's quite different constitu­
tional requirements that "[t]he assessment of all property shall be 
equal and uniform."188 and that "[p]roperty tax levies shall be uni­
form."189 The specific language of the South Carolina Constitution 
- directed to assessment of property and to property tax levies -
might well permit a court to conclude that the actual distribution of 
state funds to property owners did not violate those constitutional 
strictures. Under these circumstances, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court would have had more justification than it had in Westvaco for 
concluding that the taxing-and-spending scheme was acceptable, 
because the South Carolina Constitution does not limit "distribu­
tions" of governmental revenues.190 In short, a government pay­
ment may violate a constitutional rule that "taxation shall be 
uniform" but not one that requires uniformity in property tax 
"assessments" or "levies." 
b. Credits, Exemptions, and the Twin-lndicia Rule of Thumb. 
New Energy and kindred cases191 leave no doubt that internaliza­
tion is a key factor in assessing constitutional linkage questions. Is 
it nonetheless possible to relax the conditions of our paradigmatic 
example by removing the factor of internalization while still retain­
ing a tight enough relationship between a taxing measure and a tax 
credit or exemption to justify their joint consideration? Maryland 
v. Louisiana192 shows that the answer to this question is "yes." In 
184. But cf. supra note 114 (suggesting that Torphy might more properly have been char-
acterized as a "subsidy" case than a "credit" case). 
185. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. 
186. State ex reL La Follette v. Torphy, 270 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Wis. 1978). 
187. Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
188. S.C. CoNST. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added). 
189. S.C. CoNST. art. X, § 6 (emphasis added}. 
190. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing Bacchus and Westinghouse 
cases). 
192. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
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that case, Louisiana imposed a tax on the "first use" of any gas 
imported into Louisiana that had not previously been subjected to 
tax elsewhere. At the same time it enacted the tax, however, the 
state put in place a series of credits and exemptions that effectively 
insulated large numbers of Louisiana producers and consumers 
from the impact of the tax. Some of these measures were enacted 
"[u]nder the specific provisions of the First-Use Tax";193 others 
were "enacted as part of the First-Use Tax package."194 The cred­
its, however, did not reduce the First-Use Tax itself but instead 
reduced other taxes owed to Louisiana. For example, under the 
severance tax credit, a taxpayer paying the First-Use Tax received 
an equivalent tax credit on any state severance tax owed in connec­
tion with production in Louisiana. As a result, the state's payments 
(in the form of tax credits and exemptions) were not "internalized" 
with respect to the First-Use Tax that was subject to challenge in 
the case. Internalization was present only in the weak sense that 
both the First-Use Tax and the payments based upon it (in the form 
of credits and exemptions) were components of the state's overall 
taxing system.195 
In addition to their lack of internalization, the credits and 
exemptions involved in Maryland v. Louisiana clearly lacked 
universality of scope because some Louisiana producers or consum­
ers still paid First-Use Taxes that were not offset by the credits or 
exemptions.196 The Court nevertheless concluded that "the 
Louisiana First-Use Tax unquestionably discriminates against inter­
state commerce in favor of local interests as the necessary result of 
various tax credits and exclusions."197 
193. 451 U.S. at 756. 
194. 451 U.S. at 756. 
195. While there was no internalization of the credit scheme at issue in Maryland v. 
Louisiana with respect to the First-Use Tax under attack, one could argue that the severance 
tax (against which First-Use Tax payments were credited) was itself unconstitutional because 
of internalization. In other words, reduction of the severance tax qua severance tax was 
conditioned on specific in-state activity, to wit, making a taxable "first use" of natural gas in 
Louisiana. In Maryland v. Louisiana itself, the state was not attacking the severance tax 
because, among other things, it lacked standing to do so; its standing was based on the fact 
that it bore the economic burden of the First-Use Tax, both in its own right and as parens 
patriae. See 451 U.S. at 736-39. Indeed, it was precisely the lack of severance tax liability 
that gave the First-Use Tax its bite for the First-Use taxpayers in the case. If such taxpayers 
had had preexisting severance tax liability, the First-Use Tax would not have imposed upon 
them any additional tax burden. 
196. In particular, the tax credit did not benefit any in-state taxpayers required to pay 
First-Use taxes but not obligated to pay any severance tax. See 451 U.S. at 756-57. 
197. 451 U.S. at 756. See generally Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation in the Federal 
System: Perspectives on Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas, 55 TuL. L. RE.v. 601 
(1981). 
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Maryland v. Louisiana suggests that courts may well find 
linkage between a tax and a spending measure - that comes in the 
form of a credit or an exemption - even though (1) the credit is 
not against the tax itself but ·against some other tax, and (2) the 
credits and exemptions do not apply to all members of the favored 
class of taxpayers. In Maryland v. Louisiana, it was enough to 
establish linkage that there was simultaneity and strong correlation. 
Strong correlation existed because (1) the amount of the "pay­
ment" the credits and exemptions afforded - for example, in the 
form of severance tax reductions - was a direct function of the 
amount of the First-Use Tax paid (thus, there was computational 
correlation) and (2) the duration of credits and exemptions neces­
sarily was tied to the duration of the First-Use Tax because they 
were claimable only to the extent the taxpayer paid the First-Use 
Tax (thus, there was durational correlation). In these circum­
stances, the Court deemphasized - to the point of apparent irrele­
vance - the absence of the scope factor created by the inability of 
some Louisiana First-Use taxpayers to take advantage of the credits 
and exemptions. With respect to this factor, the Court decreed: 
"[W]e need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding 
that it unconstitutionally discriminates."198 
In our view, Maryland v. Louisiana illustrates the operation of 
our Principle #2 twin-criteria rule of thumb in the credit or exemp­
tion context. Even absent internalization, two of the remaining 
three objective indicia were enough to establish linkage. Simulta­
neity and strong correlation sufficed to trigger a finding of unlawful 
tax discrimination. 
c. Credits, Exemptions, and the Five-Factor Analysis. Does the 
foregoing analysis suggest that unconstitutionality lurks in all tax 
credits and exemptions confined to a class of beneficiaries who 
could not constitutionally be favored by way of a discriminatory tax 
rate? In other words, if a state may not enact taxing measures that 
favor residents over nonresidents, or local businesses over inter­
state businesses, or state retirees over federal retirees - for exam­
ple, by imposing a tax only upon nonresidents, interstate businesses, 
or federal retirees - can the state ever accomplish the same objec­
tive by enacting a facially nondiscriminatory tax and then providing 
the favored group with a credit or an exemption related to the tax? 
If the credit or exemption is given against the particular tax in 
question, the answer is almost always "no" because of the operation 
198. 451 U.S. at 760. 
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of the virtually per se strong-internalization rule. In such a case, 
even the lack of simultaneity cannot cut the link forged by state 
lawmakers themselves. If the credit or exemption is given with 
respect to some other tax, however, the· answer is less certain. 
Suppose an income tax is imposed on all residents and nonresi­
dents, but a credit equal to the income tax is granted to homeown­
ers against property taxes due on their principal residence. Does 
this taxing scheme violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause on 
the ground that income tax obligations are effectively less for resi­
dents than nonresidents? Perhaps not. 
In this case, there is strong correlation for exactly the same rea­
sons that strong correlation existed in Maryland v. Louisiana. In 
particular, there is durational linkage because the property tax 
credit will last only as long as the income tax, and there is computa­
tional correlation because the property tax is reduced on a dollar­
for-dollar basis as income taxes are paid.199 Thus, the other linkage 
factors - including simultaneity and scope - will play a critical 
role in our case. If, as in Maryland v. Louisiana, the legislature 
enacted the taxing and "spending" measures together as part of a 
single legislative action, the case for treating the two as linked, and 
thus constitutionally suspect, is so strong that we would apply the 
rule of thumb embodied in our Principle #2. In particular, simulta­
neity brings into play the same political process argument the 
Supreme Court found supportive of linkage in West Lynn Cream­
ery: The risk of legislative abuse in laying the tax is heightened 
because many in-state residents who would otherwise oppose it are 
"mollified" through contemporaneous enactment of the home­
owner credit.20° If, on the other hand, the state implements the 
homeowners' property tax credit years after the income tax, per­
haps in a year of a large budget surplus, the case for treating the 
two measures as linked becomes much weaker. 
In particular, this change in the facts would negate the operation 
of the rule of thumb in our homeowners' credit hypothetical 
because, in the absence of simultaneity, strong correlation would 
stand alone as an objective linkage factor. Under these circum­
stances, there is not the sort of universality of scope that was pres­
ent in our paradigmatic case. In our paradigm, after all, the state 
imposed its tax generally on residents and nonresidents, and all res­
idents received the benefit of the exemption or the credit. Hence, 
199. See supra text following note 170. 
200. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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the tax and the tax relief provision worked in lockstep to create a 
scheme that in appearance and in fact discriminated blatantly 
against nonresidents. 
In our homeowners' credit hypothetical, as in our paradigm, the 
state lays its income tax on residents and nonresidents alike. In 
contrast to the paradigm, however, only some residents - namely, 
those who own a principal residence that generates property tax 
liability - reap the benefit of the credit. This much looser fit 
between the class of in-state taxpayers and the class of credit recipi­
ents weakens the case for finding linkage as a matter of both form 
and function. There now are in-state surrogates to represent the 
interests of burdened outsiders - namely, all of the many state res­
idents who do not own and pay taxes on a home.201 
In short, using our methodology, the only basis for finding 
linkage in our hypothetical case would be under the Principle #3 
five-factor analysis. Moreover, because we detect no clear policy 
concerns that favor a finding of linkage, we would conclude that no 
linkage exists. 
Working through cases subject to Principle #3 inevitably will 
present analytical challenges. Assume, for example, that a state 
grants a total exemption from sales or use taxes for the purchase of 
industrial equipment for in-state use, but further provides that the 
credit will operate only so long as the state's corporate income tax 
remains in effect. Perhaps, because of this durational link, a court 
would characterize the otherwise constitutionally unobjectionable 
sales and use tax exemption202 as a de facto income tax exemption 
susceptible to dormant Commerce Clause attack.203 'The case for 
thus characterizing the exemption would gain even more momen­
tum if the amount of the tax break corresponded with the income 
tax - for example, if instead of providing a full-scale sales and use 
tax exemption, the state afforded a credit that constituted ten per­
cent of income taxes paid. In our view, the combination of strong 
forms of durational correlation and computational correlation in 
this case gives rise to a respectable argument for linkage, even 
absent strong internalization, simultaneity, and universality of 
scope. 
201. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
202. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 15, at 829-34 (discussing business­
development-based relief from sales and use taxes). 
203. See id. at 817-20 (discussing Westinghouse case and corporate income tax 
exemptions). 
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Perhaps, in the end, the case would turn on the decisionmaker's 
sense of sound policy. Some judges, in particular, would be unable 
to find a fair distinction between our hypothetical corporate­
income-tax/sales-or-use-tax-exemption case and Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. v. Tully. 204 They would strike down the program in 
light of the Court's oft-expressed condemnation of tax laws that 
"encourage out-of-state firms to compete in the [state]" because 
"such promotion of in-state markets at the expense of out-of-state 
ones furthers the 'economic Balkanization' that our Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has long sought to prevent."20s 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, once one substantially 
departs from the paradigmatic case of a tax credit or exemption 
enacted along with and exactly offsetting the underlying tax - in 
which there is no need to balance one linkage factor against 
another because they all sit on the same side of the scale - the 
need arises to canvass other relevant factors to determine whether a 
taxing measure and a spending measure make up, for constitutional 
purposes, an integrated whole. For example, the "fit" in New 
Energy and Maryland v. Louisiana between the tax and the tax 
credit was not as tight as it was in our paradigmatic case because 
some local businesses still paid, without any relief, the underlying 
tax. Even so, in both cases, the Court treated the tax and credit as 
linked - and properly so in our judgment - because of other fac­
tors: New Energy demonstrated strong internalization, and in 
Maryland v. Louisiana there was the combination of simultaneity 
and correlation, together with at least a weak form of internaliza­
tion. In our homeowner tax credit hypothetical,2°6 by contrast, the 
combination of non-internalization, non-simultaneity, and non­
universality-of-scope could easily lead a court to conclude that the 
taxing and spending measures are not linked, even though their 
"net effect" seems to be the imposition of a discriminatory �urden 
on nonresidents. On the other hand, strong correlation and consid­
erations of policy might lead a court to find linkage in our 
corporate-income-tax/sales-or-use-tax-exemption hypothetical.207 
If so, a linkage would exist - as it may in other cases that involve 
application of our Principle #3 five-factor analysis - even in the 
204. 466 U.S. 388 {1984) (invalidating tax credit afforded to corporate income tax payers 
based on their location of export operations within taxing state). 
205. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848, 855 n.3 {1996) (quoting Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)); see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 757 
{1981). 
206. See supra text following note 198. 
207. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text. 
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absence of strong internalization, simultaneity, and universality of 
scope. 
d. Credits, Exemptions, and Federal-Taxation-Related Policy. 
We have just seen how the policies that drive tax-discrimination 
rules may influence judicial resolution of linkage questions.2os We 
also have seen, and will continue to see, that there is a variety of 
such policies that may come into play.209 There is, however, one 
potential policy-driven principle that deserves extended treatment 
because the Supreme Court itself has suggested its centrality. This 
principle - if it is a principle - emanates from the 
intergovernmental-tax-immunity decision in Davis, in which eight 
Justices relied on federal income tax law to rebuff Justice Stevens's 
argument that the Court should treat a state-retiree income tax 
exemption no differently from a state-retiree benefit increase.210 
What are the implications of this aspect of Davis on linkage analysis 
with respect to state tax credits and exemptions? 
Assume, for example, that a state grants an income tax exemp­
tion for all monies paid to contractors for work on state, but not on 
federal or private, construction projects. At first blush, this exemp­
tion seems to run head on into the Davis principle, which focused 
on discriminatory tax advantages afforded by the state to "those 
with whom it deals itself."211 Justice Stevens, however, would 
surely object to invalidation of a state-contractor exemption on this 
ground no less vigorously than he objected to invalidation of the 
state-retiree exemption in Davis.212 He would argue that it "trivial­
izes the Supremacy Clause to interpret it as prohibiting the States 
from providing through this limited tax exemption what the State 
has an unquestionable right to provide through increased [contract 
payments]."213 
As we have seen, when Justice Stevens advanced this argument 
in Davis, the majority parried his thrust by citing federal tax law. 
Specifically, the majority distinguished a retirement benefit increase 
from the grant of an exemption for retirement income on the 
ground that the award of the exemption was "at the expense of the 
208. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
210. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989); see also supra notes 
64-65 and accompanying text. 
211. 489 U.S. at 815 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. 
v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960)). 
212. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
213. Davis, 489 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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federal treasury,"214 given that the increased retirement benefit 
would be subject to federal income tax whereas the exemption 
would not.215 This response to Justice Stevens's "trivialization" 
argument, however, does not carry over to the. state-contractor case 
because the federal tax consequences of a state-contractor tax 
exemption tum out to be very different from the tax consequences 
of a state-retiree tax exemption. Indeed, the federal income tax 
consequences of affording a state contractor a state income tax 
exemption are no different at all from the federal tax consequences 
of increasing the contractor's compensation in an amount necessary 
to place it in the same economic position it would enjoy under the 
exemption. 
To be sure, any increase in the contractor's compensation drives 
up federal tax revenues by increasing the contractor's taxable 
income. The state's grant of an equivalent state tax exemption, 
however, drives up the contractor's federal taxable income in pre­
cisely the same amount because federal law gives federal taxpayers 
a deduction for state tax payments. In other words, because the 
grant of a state tax exemption removes an otherwise available fed­
eral tax deduction, the grant of such an exemption operates - no 
less than the award of additional compensation - to increase fed­
eral taxes.216 
At first glance, this analysis suggests that the majority erred in 
Davis itself when it posited that the state-retiree tax exemption at 
issue generated less federal tax revenue than would an equivalent 
state-retiree benefit increase. After all, state taxes paid by state 
retirees are every bit as deductible on federal returns as state taxes 
paid by state contractors.217 There is, however, an important differ­
ence between the two cases: Building contractors' state income tax 
214. 489 U.S. at 815 n.4. 
215. Alternatively, one might say that the tax exemption for state retirement income 
allowed the state to reduce its compensation to state employees, thereby reducing federal tax 
revenues. 
216. Assume, for example, $100 of contractor income, a state corporate income tax rate 
of 10% (about equal to the present rate in California, New York, and Pennsylvania, see 1 
Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide (CCH) 'll 170 (1996)), and a federal corporate 
income tax rate of 34%, see I.R.C. § ll(b) (1994). If the contractor's income is exempt from 
state taxes, the contractor pays $34 in federal taxes and keeps $66. To maintain the contrac­
tor in the same economic position if the state were to eliminate the exemption, the state 
woµld have to increase its contract payments to $111.11. In this case, the contractor would 
receive $111.11 in compensation, pay $11.11 in state taxes, which it would deduct for federal 
tax purposes, leaving the contractor with $100 of federal taxable income, $34 of which would 
be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service. The contractor would thus end up with the 
same $66 it retained under the state tax exemption. In both cases, the federal government 
receives the same $34 in taxes. 
217. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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payments constitute deductible business expenses21s that always 
reduce federal taxable income; retirees' state income tax payments, 
in contrast, constitute personal expenses219 that reduce federal taxa­
ble income only when claimed as itemized deductions.220 In fact, 
federal retirees often claim the standard deduction rather than 
itemizing personal deductions. Thus the state's grant of a retire­
ment-income tax exemption is different from a retirement-benefit 
payment increase, because the award of the tax exemption -
unlike the benefit increase - does not influence a nonitemizing 
taxpayer's federal tax bill. 
For this reason, our state-contractor case poses in stark terms 
the question whether the Court in Davis meant what it said when it 
leaned on the operation of federal tax law to answer Justice 
Steven's it's-just-like-a-payment critique. If the Court actually con­
fronted our state-contractor exemption, would it stick with its 
federal-tax-impact reasoning, deem the exemption indistinguishable 
from a payment increase, distinguish Davis on this ground, and thus 
find no intergovernmental tax immunity problem? We doubt it. 
If we are right, it means the Court someday must retract its 
federal-tax-driven response in Davis to Justice Stevens's it's-just­
like-a-payment analysis. Perhaps a better answer to the Davis dis­
sent would have been to say that the outright award of cash benefits 
is more visible and subject to political checks - and thus less likely 
to generate unjustified discrimination - than the grant of a tax 
exemption.221 An even better response to the Davis dissent, how­
ever, would have focused on the factor of internalization - a 
linkage characteristic that both the state-retiree income tax exemp­
tion in Davis and our hypothetical state-contractor income tax 
exemption have in common.222 In particular, we would say that our 
hypothetical state-contractor case - like Davis itself - was subject 
to the virtually per se rule of linkage triggered by strong internaliza­
tion. We also would say that it reflects unsound constitutional pol­
icy to let linkage determinations - in intergovernmental tax 
immunity or other tax-discrimination cases - hinge on the subtle 
and ever-shifting intricacies of federal income tax law. 
218. See I.R.C. §§ 162{a), 164{a) (1994). 
219. See I.R.C. § 164(a) {1994). 
220. See I.R.C. §§ 62-63 {1994). 
221. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 211-12 {1994) {Scalia, J., con­
curring in the judgment) (noting commentators' reliance on this point in defending most state 
business subsidies against dormant Commerce Clause attack). 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 210-11. 
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4. Outright Government Payments 
a. Payments and the Twin-lndicia Rule of Thumb. When we 
leave the rea1m of tax credits and exemptions for the rea1m of direct 
government payments, we immediately confront one major differ­
ence that is critical to linkage analysis: Because there is no reduc­
tion in any tax qua tax, neither the factor of internalization nor the 
virtually per se rule it triggers223 can apply to such cases.224 To be 
sure, there may be circumstances - as the foregoing discussion has 
indicated225 - when a tax and a subsidy are so closely "con­
join[ ed]"226 in "an integrated regulation"227 that the court will find 
an unconstitutional linkage. In general, however, the absence of 
internalization in both the strong and weak senses - through 
reduction of the tax in question or the reduction of some other tax 
- substantially undercuts the case for linkage whenever the state 
makes outright payments of cash. 
The point is illustrated by comparing the result in New Energy, 
in which the Court found a link between Ohio's nondiscriminatory 
motor fuel tax and its credit against that tax for locally produced 
ethanol, with the result that would have ensued if the state had 
effectuated its spending program by way of a subsidy rather than a 
credit. In a unanimous opinion, the Court in New Energy declared: 
It has not escaped our notice that the appellant here, which is eli­
gible to receive a cash subsidy under Indiana's program for in-state 
ethanol producers, is the potential beneficiary of a scheme no less 
discriminatory than the one that it attacks, and no less effective in 
conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors. To 
believe the Indiana scheme is valid, however, is not to believe that the 
Ohio scheme must be valid as well. The Commerce Clause does not 
prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in 
the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with 
the State's regulation of interstate commerce. Direct subsidization of 
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; 
discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.228 
The Court's assertion that "[ d]irect subsidization of domestic 
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce 
Clause] prohibition"229 makes an important, though implicit, state-
223. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51, 157-59. 
224. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 240-42 (discussing true tax rebates). 
225. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
226. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199. 
227. 512 U.S. at 201. 
228. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). 
229. 486 U.S. at 278. 
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ment about linkage analysis. Even though a tax credit and a sub­
sidy may carry with them economically equivalent effects,23o there 
are circumstances in which courts will invalidate only the tax credit 
under the Commerce Clause because only the tax credit constitutes 
what the Commerce Clause forbids - state regulation, in the form 
of taxation, of interstate commerce.231 In other words, the very 
nature of a tax credit or exemption is that it intertwines with a tax; 
thus it is subject to constitutional analysis as an integral component 
of that tax. A subsidy, by contrast, may have strong enough con­
nections to a taxing measure to qualify as part of an "integrated 
regulation,''232 but according to both New Energy and West Lynn 
Creamery this will not "ordinarily" be the case.233 
What, then, should the law require to turn the "ordinarily" 
benign government subsidy into an integral part of a discriminatory 
tax program? Insofar as West Lynn Creamery is our guide, it 
emphasizes one linkage factor we have identified above: simultane­
ity.234 The Court relied on the political dynamics of the enactment 
of the taxing and spending measures as the glue that held them 
together for constitutional purposes.235 As it did so, however, the 
Court paid no attention to the absence of other linking factors that 
we have identified as significant. First, there was no internalization 
of the spending measure and the tax - no tax qua tax was reduced 
by the subsidy. Second, the spending measure lacked a universal 
scope of coverage. Indeed, the spending measure not only failed to 
provide relief from the burden of the levy to all those who dealt 
with the favored product - dealers in-state milk - it favored a 
wholly different class of in-state beneficiaries - in-state producers 
who were never subject to the tax at all.236 Perhaps the key to West 
Lynn Creamery is that, on close inspection, there was a significant 
230. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 15, at 835. 
231. See id. at 794 (setting forth authorities holding that taxation is a form of regulation 
for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause). 
232. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 201. 
233. See 512 U.S. at 199 n.15 (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278). The West Lynn 
Creamery case is discussed supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65. 
235. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
236. Of course, one could say that the tax burden and subsidy benefit would be passed 
back and forth between the dealers and producers in a way that would minimize the practical 
significance of this nonalignment. The Court, however, often has hesitated to assume that 
these sorts of pass-throughs occur. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848, 859 
(1996) (citing "the frequently extreme complexity of economic incidence analysis"); 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 47 (1990) 
("[D]etermining whether a particular business cost has in fact been passed on to customers or 
suppliers entails a highly sophisticated theoretical and factual inquiry . . . •  "). 
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correlation between the milk payments and the milk tax. In partic­
ular, there existed both source correlation, because all milk pay­
ments came out of a fund made up entirely of milk tax proceeds, 
and durational correlation, because given the specific source of the 
subsidies they could be paid out only so long as the state imposed 
the milk tax. These factors established strong correlation. Thus, 
because West Lynn Creamery involved both simultaneity and corre­
lation, the case fell within our twin-indicia rule of thumb.237 
While the Court's decision in West Lynn Creamery is helpful to 
the extent that it signals some factors that should inform the linkage 
inquiry, it is less than helpful in indicating how courts should bal­
ance various linking factors against one another. Beyond the bland 
admonition that "our cases have eschewed formalism for a sensi­
tive, case-by-case analysis of purpose and effects,"238 one finds in 
West Lynn Creamery no explicit guidance as to the relative weight 
courts should accord relevant linkage criteria. Perhaps the princi­
pal practical teaching of West Lynn Creamery - although it is one 
that is implicit rather than explicit - lies in the notion that simulta­
neity is a central factor in subsidy cases. Because internalization is 
never present in the subsidy context,239 simultaneity assumes a 
much greater relative importance when government spending 
measures take the form of outright payments than when govern­
ment spending measures take the form of credits or exemptions. 
b. Payments, Close Rule-of-Thumb Cases, and Five-Factor 
Analysis. To say that simultaneity is important in outright spending 
cases is not to say that it is a sine qua non of establishing linkage 
between a tax and an outright-spending measure. Consider this 
variation on our paradigmatic case: In Year 1, the state puts in 
place an income tax payable by all individuals who earn income in 
the state at a rate of five percent. In Year 2, the state enacts sepa­
rate legislation giving every state resident a "subsidy" equal to five 
percent of income. 
237. We acknowledge that this conclusion is debatable since the correlation involved in 
West Lynn Creamery was not as strong as it might be, given the probable absence of compu­
tational correlation. Even if West Lynn Creamery were a Principle #3 case, however, we 
would find linkage in light of the likely presence of some measure of de facto scope and 
strong policy responsiveness. For a detailed development of the role of the policy responsive­
ness criterion in West Lynn Creamery and other dormant Commerce Clause subsidy cases, 
see Coenen, supra note 51, at 36-56 (discussing West Lynn Creamery) and id. at 56-70 (dis­
cussing other dormant Commerce Clause cases). See also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 
15, at 834-70 (discussing arguments for and against invalidating various forms of business 
development subsidies). 
238. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 201. 
239. But cf. supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (discussing the presence of inter­
nalization in tax rebates). 
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Does this "subsidy" provide the sort of de facto discriminatory 
tax relief that runs afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause? 
Notwithstanding the absence of simultaneity, we think that it does, 
because it triggers the twin-indicia rule of thumb. There is true 
universality of scope because all residents, and only residents, enjoy 
the benefit of the spending program. Likewise, in our view, there 
may well be sufficiently strong correlation. Although there is no 
durational correlation - and probably no source correlation either 
- the facts reveal very powerful computational correlation. This is 
the case because the tax base and "subsidy base" are exactly the 
same: each is a function of annual income. Moreover, the modes of 
calculating the subsidy and tax also are identical: each is a percent­
age of income; indeed, each is exactly five percent. In our view, this 
common-base/common-formula version of correlation reflects the 
highest degree of computational correlation, in that it resembles 
something like strong internalization itself.240 In other words, there 
exists a propinquity between the true rebates that trigger the virtu­
ally per se rule241 and subsidies that in their nature are, like rebates, 
a mathematical function of a particular tax. If our virtually per se 
rule of internalization almost applies based on computational corre­
lation alone, then surely it seems logical that the twin-indicia rule of 
thumb should kick in because universality of scope also is present. 
Even if the twin-indicia rule were deemed inapplicable, however, 
we would find linkage in this case. Why? Because the fifth and 
final factor - policy responsiveness - strongly favors a finding of 
linkage. In particular, our two-year tax-and-subsidy hypothetical 
presents exactly the same all-residents-are-favored policy-based 
argument we found instructive in finding a Privileges and Immuni­
ties Clause violation in our paradigmatic case.242 
Strong correlation may also support linkage, despite the lack of 
simultaneity, in dormant Commerce Clause cases. Elsewhere we 
have posited the case in which "State A charges a one percent tax 
on all goods sold at wholesale" and, by way of legislation enacted at 
a different time, also "provides a one percent-of-wholesale-price 
cash subsidy for goods produced within the state. "243 In this case, 
there is no internalization, no simultaneity, and no universality of 
scope because some businesses that are not subject to tax -
namely, those that sell their products outside the state - nonethe-
240. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51, 157-59. 
241. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra note 171-73 and accompanying text. 
243. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 15, at 863. 
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less can cash in on the subsidy. We would nonetheless find linkage 
based largely on the same intense form of correlation present in our 
privileges and immunities hypothetical: The tax base and "subsidy 
base" are precisely the same because both the tax and subsidy are a 
function of wholesale revenues, and both the tax and the subsidy 
are computed in the same way because each is a fixed percentage of 
such revenues. We believe that such strong signals of correlation -
when coupled with a scope that is marked by intrastate over­
inclusiveness244 - suffice to establish linkage. At the least, how­
ever, the case lies "close enough to West Lynn Creamery to raise 
some judicial eyebrows."245 
c. A Return to Ragsdale. Having marked the outlines of proper 
linkage analysis, we return to the difficult intergovernmental tax 
immunity issue raised by the Sheehy and Ragsdale cases.246 Those 
cases presented the question whether a benefit increase for state 
retirees should be deemed a de facto tax rebate when enacted 
simultaneously with the state's repeal of a state-retirement-income 
exemption, as an effort to conform with the Davis ruling. 
Addressing this question, the court in Sheehy - but not the court 
in Ragsdale - found a constitutional violation. 
In our view, the court in Sheehy was right, and the court in 
Ragsdale was wrong. In the next three sections, we explain this 
conclusion, using the five-factor linkage methodology we have 
developed in the preceding pages. In the first of these sections, we 
consider whether the court in Ragsdale should have found West 
Lynn Creamery dispositive on the linkage question. After identify­
ing conflicting signals on this point, we turn in the next section to 
application of the twin-indicia rule of thumb. Then, having con­
cluded that the rule of thumb probably was inapplicable in 
Ragsdale, in the final section we apply to the case our more wide­
ranging five-factor mode of analysis. Paying particular attention to 
policy responsiveness, we conclude that the court in Ragsdale 
reached the wrong result. 
i. Ragsdale and West Lynn Creamery. A proper way to begin 
analysis of Ragsdale is to ask whether that case was squarely con­
trolled by the essentially contemporaneous Supreme Court decision 
in West Lynn Creamery. Clearly there is a tension between the 
cases.247 This tension arises because the court in Ragsdale refused 
244. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
245. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 15, at 864. 
246. See supra notes 68-103 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
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to treat as a "tax rebate" a benefit increase for state retirees that 
was enacted simultaneously with the state's imposition on them of 
its income tax. In West Lynn Creamery, however, the Court did 
characterize as a "tax rebate" a state subsidy awarded to state dairy 
farmers precisely because it was put in place simultaneously with 
the state's imposition of a milk tax.248 Can this tension be dispelled 
by constructing some logical distinction between the two cases? 
Justice Scalia might say that the use of a segregated fund in West 
Lynn Creamery served to distinguish that case from Ragsdale.249 
This suggested distinction seems weak, however, because Ragsdale 
also involved a segregated fund in that the state paid its additional 
pension benefits out of its separate pool of retirement monies.250 
Even more important, only Justice Scalia (joined by Justice 
Thomas) stressed the state's use of a segregated fund in West Lynn 
Creamery.251 Because the majority in that case assigned the segre­
gated-fund factor no significance whatsoever, it provides a most 
unlikely basis for constructing the key distinction between West 
Lynn Creamery and Ragsdale. 
A more promising basis for distinguishing the two cases lies in 
the Court's reasoning in Davis. As we have seen, the Court in that 
case stated that a state-retiree tax exemption was different than a 
state-retiree benefit increase because the latter form of relief was 
less invasive of federal tax collections.252 It thus comes as no sur­
prise ihat, in upholding the pension benefit increases at issue in 
Ragsdale, the court pointed to their federal taxability.253 
Prior analysis reveals why a milk-producer subsidy is not distin­
guishable from a milk-producer tax exemption in terms of its 
impact on federal tax revenues in the same way that a state pension 
248. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
250. To be sure, the "segregated fund" involved in Ragsdale could be distinguished from 
the one involved in West Lynn Creamery on the grounds that (1) the tax monies involved in 
Ragsdale - unlike in West Lynn Creamery - were paid into the general treasury and not 
channeled into a separate fund, and (2) West Lynn Creamery - unlike Ragsdale - involved 
construction of a segregated fund entirely out of specific taxes laid on a discrete industry to 
whose in-state members' benefit the segregated fund inured. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. 
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1994); Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348, 
1356 (Or.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995). At the same time, it may be true that the 
state's channeling of payments out of its segregated retirement fund created a significant 
check on later political tampering with the payment program. If this was the case, it would 
cut in favor of likening Ragsdale to West Lynn Creamery on "segregated fund" grounds. 
251. See 512 U.S. at 207 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 37-39. 
252. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. It is surprising, however, that in doing so 
the court did not rely on, or even cite, the Davis decision. 
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payment is distinguishable from a state pension tax exemption.254 
It follows that, if a court were to accept the underlying reasoning of 
Davis, it might well refuse to liken a retirement payment to a retire­
ment benefit exemption, even though the Supreme Court did assim­
ilate a milk subsidy to a milk tax exemption in West Lynn Creamery. 
No less important, Davis's expression of concern about state 
interference with federal tax collections could serve to distinguish 
Ragsdale from West Lynn Creamery even if federal taxation of milk 
sales and retirement benefits followed exactly the same pattern -
that is, even if the award of milk subsidies, like the award of retire­
ment payments, produced more federal tax collections than the 
award of an otherwise economically equivalent tax exemption. This 
is the case because West Lynn Creamery concerned the dormant 
Commerce Clause, whereas Ragsdale involved the intergovernmen­
tal tax immunity rule. 
This fact matters because of the linkage factor we call policy 
responsiveness. In particular, it is hard to see how a state's decision 
to help local businesses in a way that reduces federal taxes increases 
the danger to the underlying national-common-market goals of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.255 On the other hand, when a state 
cuts into federal revenue collections by granting its retirees a tax 
exemption, rather than a benefit increase, such a choice affronts the 
principle of national supremacy that lies at the root of the intergov­
ernmental tax immunity doctrine.256 In short, the federal-tax-based 
policy considerations invoked in Davis provide a basis for distin­
guishing Ragsdale from West Lynn Creamery on the simple ground 
that the two cases involved applications of different doctrines 
driven by different underlying concerns. 
There is, however, a profound difficulty with distinguishing West 
Lynn Creamery and Ragsdale on this ground, in that Davis's focus 
on federal taxability was misplaced. We have developed this point 
at length in discussing tax credits and exemptions.257 The essential 
point of that discussion - that courts should not rely on federal tax 
254. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. In particular, a state's choice of 
granting a retirement exemption - rather than a comparable retirement benefit increase -
would produce fewer federal tax revenues because of the availability of the standard deduc­
tion. In contrast, a tax exemption for milk dealers inevitably will result in the removal of a 
business-expense deduction by reason of the negation of an itemized state tax payment. It 
follows that while additional retirement payments and retirement-payment tax exemptions 
are unalike for purposes of federal taxation, milk subsidies and milk tax exemptions are very 
much akin. 
255. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
257. See supra notes 208-22 and accompanying text. 
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law in making linkage determinations - applies no less to outright 
state payments than it does to internalized state tax relief. 
ii. Ragsdale and the Rule of Thumb. If there is a genuine basis 
for distinguishing West Lynn Creamery from Ragsdale, it emerges 
from application of the twin-indicia rule of the thumb we have 
developed in this article.25s In West Lynn Creamery, as we have 
seen, the twin-indicia rule of thumb took hold because the case 
involved both simultaneity and strong correlation.259 
Ragsdale, like West Lynn Creamery, involved simultaneity 
because the state repealed its state-retirement-pay tax exemption at 
exactly the same time the state increased state-retirement-pay ben­
efits. Moreover, Ragsdale - like West Lynn Creamery - did not 
involve strict universality of scope.260 Universality was absent in 
Ragsdale because some state retirees who paid the newly imposed 
tax received no benefit increase, while other retirees did receive 
increases even though they paid no new tax.261 
Application of the twin-indicia rule of thumb in West Lynn 
Creamery and Ragsdale thus depended on whether there was strong 
correlation. West Lynn Creamery presented a powerful case for 
finding such correlation, because both durational and source-based 
correlations were identifiable.262 In Ragsdale, by contrast, only one 
of these forms of correlation clearly was at work. There was no 
source-based correlation because the newly imposed taxes were 
neither rebated to nor returned in the aggregate to newly taxed 
state retirees. There also was an absence of strong computational 
correlation; this was the case because, for each state retiree, any 
benefit payments were calculated as a function of years of service, 
rather than of income taxes paid.263 
In short, the court in Ragsdale - unlike the Court in West Lynn 
Creamery - confronted only one clear form of correlation: corre­
lation based on the express durational connection between the 
spending program and the newly imposed tax.264 In our view, if 
there is a plausible distinction between West Lynn Creamery and 
Ragsdale, this is it. To say there is a plausible distinction, however, 
258. See supra notes 223-39 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 21-51 and accompanying text 
260. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing West Lynn Creamery). 
261. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 21-51 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text. 
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is not to say that distinction should control if cross-cutting factors 
undermine it. 
iii. Ragsdale and Policy Responsiveness. As we have just seen, 
the facts of Ragsdale may well not have triggered the twin-indicia 
rule of thumb.265 Reaching that conclusion, however, does not end 
our linkage inquiry, but merely shifts analysis to the third stage -
that is, to evaluation of all five linkage criteria, including policy 
responsiveness. 
In our view, proper application of Principle #3 analysis reveals 
that the court missed the boat in failing to find linkage in the 
Ragsdale case. We reach this conclusion in part because, even if 
that case did not trigger the twin-indicia rule of thumb, the case 
presented a just-miss set of facts on this score.266 Given this circum­
stance, the fifth linking factor - namely, policy responsiveness -
takes on particular importance. For three separate reasons, appli­
cation of this factor leaves little doubt that Oregon's tax reform and 
spending program were linked in a manner repugnant to the inter­
governmental tax immunity principle. 
First, the Oregon Supreme Court misstepped by focusing unduly 
on the notion that "[i]ntergovernmental tax immunity does not 
require that the state treat state and federal employees the same 
way[;] it requires only that the state system of taxation be equal."267 
In M'Culloch v. Maryland,268 the Court stated the governing immu­
nity principle more broadly: "States," the Court explained, lack 
power to "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control" the 
operations of the national government "by taxation or other­
wise. "269 This seminal language cannot change later developments 
that have focused the intergovernmental immunity doctrine on 
cases involving taxation.270 At least, however, it supports an open­
stanced approach to viewing state payments as discriminatory forms 
265. But cf. infra note 266. 
266. This is because one objective linkage factor - simultaneity - clearly is present 
while another such factor - correlation - is all but, if not actually, present. There is dura­
tional correlation in the clearest possible sense in Ragsdale in that the legislature went out of 
its way to tie the duration of its benefit award to the continued taxation of state retirement 
income. The case for strong correlation also may gain strength from the uncontested fact 
that the state adopted its increased benefit program for the express purpose of offsetting the 
newly imposed tax. Fmally, while there was not a perfect universality of scope in Ragsdale, it 
is likely that most state retirees did in fact benefit from the state's payment increases. Thus 
there may well have been substantial universality or something very close to it. 
267. Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348, 1353 (Or.), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 569 (1995). 
268. 17 U.S (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
269. 17 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added). 
270. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
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of de facto tax relief in the intergovernmental tax immunity 
context. 
Second and more important, the court's analysis in Ragsdale 
failed to take account of the law of constitutional remedies. Given 
Oregon's past undisputed violation of the Davis principle, the 
Oregon Supreme Court was called upon not only to end the out­
lawed discrimination, but also to take "affirmative steps to elimi­
nate the effects of a violation of law."271 One effect of the 
legislature's pre-Davis grant of the discriminatory exemption was 
its post-Davis award of the benefit increase challenged in the 
Ragsdale suit. Given this causal nexus, the Oregon Supreme 
Court's validation of the benefit grant stood in tension with the 
most basic goal of constitutional remediation: "[T]o restore the vic­
tims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have 
occupied in the absence of such conduct."272 
Finally, the result in Ragsdale seems wrong because it runs 
counter to the basic policies that underlie the intergovernmental tax 
immunity doctrine itself. That doctrine "finds its explanation and 
justification" in "avoiding the potentialities of friction" endemic in 
state taxation of the national government's operations.273 In keep­
ing with the goal of avoiding such friction, the Court has tied the 
doctrine to the notion of discrimination. Courts will uphold a tax 
on "those who deal with the Federal Government" only if the tax 
"is imposed equally on the other similarly situated constituents of 
271. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 40 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that 
this principle has been applied in "situations which are both numerous and varied"); see also 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] 
public body which has itself been adjudged to have engaged in racial discrimination cannot 
bring itself into compliance with the Equal Protection Clause simply by ending its unlawful 
acts and adopting a neutral stance."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1, 28 (1971). 
272. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)); see also United 
States v. Virginia, 116 S. a. 2264, 2282 (1996). Notably, if the state had faced this argument 
in the Oregon courts, the state might have responded that it would have enacted the benefit 
increase instead of the tax exemption if it had known, when it enacted the exemption, of its 
illegality. From this premise, it would follow that the Court should not intervene (at least on 
remedial grounds) because retention of the later-adopted benefit increase would in fact put 
federal retirees "in the position they would have occupied" absent the illegal tax discrimina­
tion. 433 U.S. at 280. The problem with the state's argument is that it hardly comports with 
our constitutional culture to give exonerating effect to the speculative conjectures of proven 
violators of the law. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & 
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 42 & n.24 (1990) (expressing skepticism about state's argument as to 
how it would have structured tax if it had foreseen constitutional invalidity of exemption, 
deeming prediction "not easily proved" and "contrived and self-serving" in light of "the 
many complex variables that affect legislative judgment"). 
273. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 504 (1958). 
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the State."274 In this way federal interests are protected against 
state overreaching. If, but only if, such a "political check against 
abuse of the taxing power"275 is present will the court deem the 
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine inapplicable.276 
The Oregon legislature's response to Davis ran afoul of these 
guiding principles because of the real-world conditions that pre­
vailed in Oregon after the Supreme Court decided Davis. Follow­
ing Davis, both state and federal retirees in Oregon in effect 
enjoyed immunity from state taxation so long as Oregon's tax 
exemption for state employees remained on the books.211 Thus, by 
removing the explicit tax exemption disapproved by Davis, the state 
effectively imposed a new tax on, and only on, state and federal 
retirees. Justice Stevens pointed out the constitutional difficulty 
presented by this form of state action in his Davis dissent: "[A] 
special tax imposed only on federal and state employees . . . may 
reflect the type of disparate treatment that the intergovernmental 
tax immunity forbids because of the ability of the State to adjust the 
compensation of its employees to avoid any special tax burden on 
them."278 In Oregon's case, Justice Stevens's concern about the 
"ability" of the state to offset the tax burden with increased state­
retiree compensation proved well founded. The state in fact fully 
exercised its ability to provide just such an offset, at exactly the 
same time it imposed the tax, for the very purpose of sheltering 
state employees from the new burden. it imposed.279 In these cir­
cumstances, it seems likely that even Justice Stevens - the sole 
dissenter in Davis - would have found a violation of the intergov­
ernmental tax immunity doctrine in the Ragsdale case. 
There is no less reason to suppose that the Davis majority's own 
discrimination-driven analysis would have led it to find a constitu­
tional wrong in Ragsdale. In Davis, after all, the majority found a 
274. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462 (1977). 
275. 429 U.S. at 463. 
276. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 457 n.13 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) ("We have regularly relied upon the existence of . . .  political checks in considering 
the scope of the National Government's immunity from state taxation."). Of course, this 
statement is not directed toward that aspect of the tax-immunity rule that outlaws "direct" 
taxes on the national government's operations regardless of the discriminatory character of 
the exaction. See supra note 54. 
277. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 818 (1989) (emphasizing 
Court's "mandate of equal treatment" and requirement of "extending the tax exemption to 
retired federal employees" unless the state "eliminat[es] the exemption for retired state and 
local government employees"). 
278. 489 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
279. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text. 
2226 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2167 
violation of the tax immunity rule despite the fact that federal 
employees were disadvantaged in a fashion identical to the "vast 
majority" of state taxpayers.280 Even in the face of these political 
dynamics, the majority felt compelled to apply the tax immunity 
doctrine because the state had singled out its own employees for 
favored treatment. "The danger that a State is engaging in imper­
missible discrimination against the Federal Government," the 
Court explained, "is greatest when the State acts to benefit itself 
and those in privity with it."281 
Following this logic, Oregon - in the wake of Davis - commit­
ted two sins, rather than only one. First, in protecting the interests 
of only state employees, Oregon ignored the principle that, in tax­
related activities, the state must treat "those who deal with the 
[Federal] Government as well as it treats those with whom it deals 
itself."282 Second, Oregon selectively protected its own retirees in a 
setting where the interests of federal workers enjoyed no meaning­
ful protection in the state political process. This was the case 
because, after Davis, state residents confronted a situation in which 
in effect both state retirees and federal retirees enjoyed a blanket 
exemption from state income taxation.283 In other words, the full 
personal income tax burden of the state was to be borne by those 
whose work was in the private sector. Against this backdrop, fed­
eral retirees plainly lacked surrogate protection; private workers 
and retirees were not about to object when the state lightened their 
prospective burden by extending its personal income tax to both 
federal and state retirees - less only the partial offsetting grant of 
increased benefits to state retirees. 
In short, as the Oregon legislature moved to modify its taxing 
system in response to Davis, federal retirees enjoyed no surrogate 
protection whatsoever. For this reason, Davis provides an a fortiori 
argument for invalidation of the combined new-tax-but-more­
benefits program at issue in Ragsdale. Put differently, the underly­
ing "danger of discrimination" logic of Davis2B4 lends support to 
280. See 489 U.S. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
281. 489 U.S. at 815 n.4. 
282. 489 U.S. at 815 n.4 (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 
376, 385 (1960)). 
283. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
284. See 489 U.S. at 815 n.4; see also 489 U.S. at 820 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
the Court's continued emphasis on the "political check" provided by contemporaneous taxa­
tion of "all other residents and voters of the State" to counteract the fact that "the United 
States does not have a direct voice in the state legislatures" (quoting United States v. County 
of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462-64 (1977); Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 545 
(1983))). 
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viewing the purportedly permissible "spending" measure at issue in 
Ragsdale as unconstitutionally discriminatory tax relief. 
iv. A Reprise. There is room for disagreement about the proper 
result in Ragsdale. At the least, however, the preceding analysis 
shows how courts can approach outright-payment linkage cases in a 
more systematic and policy-sensitive manner. We believe that using 
such an analysis in Ragsdale would have produced a different and 
better opinion, and perhaps a different result. 
C. Restructuring Relative Tax Burdens 
There is a final category of cases - involving neither tax credits 
or exemptions nor outright state payments - that any comprehen­
sive treatment of linkage issues must take into account. Suppose, 
for example, that a state passes a law that imposes a non­
discriminatory tax on everyone who drives an automobile in a state 
at the rate of a penny per mile. At the same time, however, the 
state enacts a law that reduces in-state automobile registration fees 
by an amount that offsets, at least for most in-state automobile 
owners, the penny-per-mile tax. Would the state's actions amount 
to the imposition of an unconstitutionally discriminatory tax on out­
of-state owners of automobiles driven in the state? 
A similar question arose in American Trucking Assns. v. 
Scheiner, 285 which presented the following facts: Many years prior 
to the case, the state had imposed a registration fee on all in-state 
trucks. Later, the state imposed a fiat axle tax on all trucks using its 
roads and, at the same time, reduced registration fees on in-state 
trucks in an amount that, for all practical purposes, was equivalent 
to the new axle tax.286 Because the state's actions taken together 
triggered an additional net tax liability only for out-of-state truck­
ers, those truckers argued that the state had violated the Commerce 
Clause antidiscrimination rule.287 In the end the Court did not 
reach this question because it found that the fiat axle tax offended 
the dormant Commerce Clause regardless of the state's action in 
decreasing in-state registration fees.288 In a dissenting opinion, 
however, Justice Scalia did address the out-of-state truckers' simul-
285. 483 U.S. 266 {1987). 
286. See 483 U.S. at 270-75; 483 U.S. at 304 {Scalia, J., dissenting). 
287. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
288. The Court focused in particular on the unapportioned nature of the tax. Because 
this feature of the tax imposed a higher per mile burden on interstate than on intrastate 
trucks, due to the fact that the former traveled fewer miles in the state than the latter, the 
Court found the tax discriminatory in effect. See American Trucking Assns., 483 U.S. at 284-
86. 
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taneous-registration-fee-reduction argument and found it wanting. 
He reasoned that "both the axle tax and the reduction in registra­
tion fees are independently nondiscriminatory."289 Addressing the 
challengers' effort to link the two state actions, he emphasized that 
the case was different from Maryland v. Louisiana.290 As Justice 
Scalia explained: 
Pennsylvania provides no exemption from its axle tax for in-state 
truckers, and does not permit axle tax payments to be used as credits 
against the registration fee. The axle tax alone - unlike the gas tax in 
Maryland v. Louisiana - is on its face nondiscriminatory.291 
In finding no fatal linkage between the imposition of axle taxes and 
the reduction of registration fees, Justice Scalia thus relied on the 
same internalization linkage factor we have identified above. For 
him it was critical that the state's legislation with respect to registra­
tion fees did not reduce "on its face" either the axle tax or any 
other tax obligation.292 
Justice Scalia was not oblivious to the claim that his position 
elevated "form" over "substance."293 His response is instructive: 
It may well be that the lowering of the exclusively intrastate regis­
tration fee has the same net effect as would a tax credit for the axle 
tax. But so would have the establishment of the registration fee and 
the axle tax at their current levels in the first place. To determine the 
facially discriminatory character of a tax not on the basis of the tax 
alone, but on the basis of the structure of a State's tax code, is to 
extend our case law into a new field, and one in which principled dis­
tinctions become impossible. What if, for example, the registration 
fees for Pennsylvania-based barges, rather than trucks, had been 
reduced in an amount that precisely compensated for the additional 
revenues to be derived from the increased axle fees? Or what if 
Pennsylvania had enacted the axle tax without reducing registration 
289. 483 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
290. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text. 
291. 483 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
292. We note that Justice Scalia did not use the tenn "internalization" or expressly con­
sider the relationship of internalization with other linkage criteria. Nevertheless, his view 
that a tax coupled with an exemption or credit is facially discriminatory, and that "the axle 
tax alone . . . is on its face nondiscriminatory," reflects the judgment that a measure that 
reduces the tax itself is properly viewed as linked to the tax whereas a measure that simply 
has the "net effect" of reducing the tax, without directly reducing it, is not properly viewed as 
"linked" to the tax. 483 U.S. 304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
We also note that one may quibble with our characterization of the registration fee reduc­
tion as a "spending" measure in the same way that a credit, exemption, or subsidy may be so 
viewed. We plead nolo contendere to the charge but believe it is beside the point for present 
purposes. The essential question addressed in the text is whether the fact that the tax in 
question is reduced by a related action is a significant indicium of "linkage," a point that does 
not depend on whether that related action is characterized as a "spending measure" or as a 
"piece of green cheese." 
293. See supra notes 124-44 and accompanying text. 
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fees, and then one year later made a corresponding reduction in truck 
registration fees? This case, of course, is more difficult than those 
examples, because the tax reduction and axle tax both apply to the 
same mode of transport and were enacted simultaneously. However, 
to inquire whether a tax reduction is close enough in time or in mode 
to another tax so that "in effect" the latter should be treated as 
facially discriminatory is to ask a question that has no answer.294 
Given Justice Scalia's unabashed hostility to the negative 
Commerce Clause,295 it is hardly surprising to find him espousing a 
strict view of the linkage required to establish that two taxing meas­
ures, in combination, impermissibly discriminate against interstate 
commerce. Nevertheless, his analysis, in a backhanded way, pro­
vides support for a number of points we have advanced above. In 
particular, Justice Scalia acknowledges - just as we have argued ­
that the case for linkage becomes "more difficult" when there is no 
simultaneity of enactment and something less than universality of 
scope.296 Justice Scalia also acknowledges - as we have urged -
that a constitutionally cognizable linkage ordinarily does exist when 
the would-be "spending" measure is marked by internalization, 
because it reduces a tax obligation directly, even in the absence of 
simultaneity and universality of scope.297 
In essence, Justice Scalia rebuffed the taxpayer's effort to link 
the axle tax and the registration fee out of fear that application of 
any linkage criteria beyond internalization would invite unduly 
indeterminate judicial inquiries in too many cases. As the preced­
ing discussion reveals, however, courts repeatedly have declined to 
take such a strict and wooden view of constitutional linkage.298 
294. American Trucking Assns., 483 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
295. See Walter Hellerstein, Justice Scalia and the Commerce Clause: Reflections of a 
State Tax Lawyer, 12 CARDOZO L. RE.v. 1763 (1991). 
296. See American Trucking Assns., 483 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The signifi­
cance of the simultaneity criterion is suggested by Justice Scalia's focus on whether the meas­
ures were "close enough in time." 483 U.S. at 305. Justice Scalia's discussion of 
"Pennsylvania-based barges" - to use our terminology - focuses on the Jack of universality 
of scope. There is no universality in his hypothesized case (or even anything close to univer­
sality) because, while the new tax falls on all truckers, the new "spending" program targets 
local barges, instead of all (or even some) local truckers. Notably, with respect to the factor 
of scope, Justice Scalia's barge hypothetical is far more problematic than West Lynn 
Creamery, in which scope was lacking as well. In West Lynn Creamery, there was at least the 
possibility of strong de facto scope, because, although milk dealers and milk producers are 
separate entities, their relationship is marked by contractual privity so that the pass-through 
of taxes or subsidy payments between them was possible and perhaps even likely. But cf. 
supra note 236 (noting Court's aversion to assuming existence of pass-throughs ). The same is 
not true with respect to the operators of trucks and barges. 
297. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
298. Indeed, in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), discussed supra in text 
accompanying notes 192-98 - the very case Justice Scalia sought to distinguish in American 
Trucking Assns. - the Court did not invalidate the Louisiana First-Use Tax "on the basis of 
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Indeed, Justice Scalia himself looked beyond internalization in West 
Lynn Creamery, when he found that another linkage factor -
namely, the state's use of a segregated fund - sufficiently tied the 
Massachusetts milk subsidy to the state's milk tax to render the 
state's program as a whole unconstitutional.299 
In the end, Justice Scalia's position reflects a concern that, at 
least in tax-restructuring cases, judicial line-drawing based on the 
sorts of factors we have identified is too unmanageable, unpredict­
able, and subject to manipulation by the courts. But few constitu­
tional rules provide ready answers to all questions, and courts in 
many contexts must and do openly weigh a variety of considera­
tions in resolving constitutional disputes.3oo Over time, courts 
applying these criteria can articulate principles that cabin judicial 
discretion. Indeed, the Court already has deeply involved itself in 
this process by drawing a strong line in New Energy between tradi­
tional tax relief and subsidy payments and by focusing in West Lynn 
Creamery on simultaneity of enactment.301 
Justice Scalia is right to suggest that tax-restructuring cases like 
American Trucking Assns. are a far cry from the case that involves 
an express exemption from or credit against an otherwise generally 
applicable tax.302 But we are unprepared to say that the sort of tax 
restructuring involved in American Trucking Assns. - which in real 
life imposes an additional tax burden only on nonlocal businesses 
- can never give rise to unconstitutional tax discrimination. The 
very features of the Pennsylvania restructuring on which Justice 
Scalia focused made the case highly problematic: the registration 
fee reduction for in-state taxpayers was adopted at the same time 
the state increased its "nondiscriminatory" tax (simultaneity); the 
fee reduction was substantially equal in amount to the tax increase 
(correlation); and those in-staters who suffered the effects of the tax 
the tax alone." American Trucking Assns., 483 U.S. at 305 {Scalia, J., dissenting). Rather, the 
Court considered the overall "structure of a State's tax code," 483 U.S. at 305, and in particu­
lar how the First-Use Tax interacted with other, entirely different state taxing provisions. See 
supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
300. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 {1995) {"These are not precise 
formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 {1941) (considering whether state is displaced by federal statute in the absence of express 
preemption and concluding that "[i]n the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear 
distinctly marked formula"). For a recent example of a constitutional case involving 
multiple-factor analysis, see BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1601-03 
(1996). 
301. See supra notes 16-20, 42-47, and accompanying text. 
302. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
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increase were precisely those in-staters who benefited from the 
registration fee reduction (universality of scope). 
In other tax-restructuring cases the fit between the imposition of 
a new tax and the reduction for in-state taxpayers of a preexisting 
tax will be much looser, so that constitutional concerns become less 
acute. Assume, for example, that Pennsylvania had repealed a gen­
eralized personal property tax at the same time it imposed its new 
across-the-board axle tax. In such a case the net "bite" of the 
state's action on in-state truckers would be less severe than its 
"bite" on out-of-state truckers because the former group would 
enjoy an immediate benefit from the personal property tax repeal. 
Even so, we believe that a court would not, and should not, find 
linkage in such a case, because the linking factors we have identi­
fied are not strongly at work. First, there would be far less justifica­
tion for finding linkage on the basis of scope in our hypothetical 
than in American Trucking Assns. To be sure, the property tax 
reduction benefits all in-state truckers, for in-state truckers by defi­
nition own in-state personal property. But the property tax reduc­
tion also would benefit every other personal property owner, 
including any out-of-state trucker that owned personal property of 
any kind within the state. Even more important, our hypothetical 
property-tax-relief case involves little, if any, correlation, because 
large numbers of property taxpayers receive various forms of tax 
relief wholly unrelated to the amount of each axle tax assessment. 
This combined lack of correlation and scope - particularly when 
coupled with the patent lack of internalization in such a case -
would press hard against finding linkage. In short, this form of tax 
restructuring would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
even though the property tax reduction would soften the blow for 
in-state truckers of the newly imposed, nondiscriminatory truck 
axle tax. 
It bears reemphasis that tax restructuring cases do differ from 
both tax-exemption or tax-credit cases and outright-payment cases. 
In this respect we agree with Justice Scalia's treatment of the sub­
ject in American Trucking Associations.303 In contrast to Justice 
Scalia, however, we do not believe that this difference means that 
tax-restructuring cases can never give rise to a finding of unconstitu­
tional tax discrimination. In particular, we are inclined to say that 
the state engaged in unlawful tax discrimination in American 
Trucking Associations. The presence in that case of simultaneity, 
303. See supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text. 
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universality of scope, and strong correlation - together with the 
state's reduction of a tax traditionally and widely imposed by states 
throughout the nation (that is, the truck registration tax) - leads us 
to suspect that an unconstitutional linkage existed.304 At the least, 
we can say that only minor changes in the facts of the case - for 
example, the establishment of stronger correlation by way of legis­
latively imposed durational connection - would lead us to find a 
constitutional violation. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has offered a look at a previously unexplored, but 
practically important, realm of constitutional tax law: what we call 
the "law of linkage." The article reveals that important issues con­
cerning the interaction of government spending and taxing meas­
ures arise in applying such differing constitutional restrictions as the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the intergovernmental tax immunity 
doctrine, and state constitutional limits on nonuniform and unequal 
taxation. This article also shows that linkage problems lurk in 
widely differing forms of state action: the simple grant of a tax 
credit or exemption from a generally applicable tax; the grant of a 
credit against one tax for payments made on another; the grant of a 
credit against a tax funded in an identifiable way by the proceeds of 
some other tax; the grant of tax rebates; the grant of state subsidies 
or other payments; and the restructuring of a tax system through 
the repeal or reduction of one tax in connection with the enactment 
and imposition of another. This article has suggested that, in all 
these cases, identifiable criteria should - and probably, in an 
unacknowledged way, do - determine whether a sufficiently close 
linkage exists between an ostensibly neutral tax and a purportedly 
independent "spending" measure to trigger application of constitu­
tional tax-discrimination rules. 
Key linkage criteria include what we call "internalization" (the 
state's explicit affording of relief from a tax itself); "simultaneity" 
(enactment of the taxing and spending measures at the same time); 
"scope" (the affording of relief by way of the spending measure to 
all, and only for all, members of the group of not-to-be-favored tax­
payers); "correlation" (the durational, computational, or source­
based alignment of the statutory taxing and spending formulas); 
and policy responsiveness (the triggering by the challenged state 
304. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 43, 92 n.288 (1988) (noting that "Pennsylvania's action departed from established inter· 
state accommodations on truck registration fees"). 
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program of specialized policy concerns that underlie the particular 
tax-discrimination doctrine involved in the case). 
By closely analyzing a number of real and hypothetical cases, we 
have illustrated how these linkage factors should interact in differ­
ing legal settings. In the end, however, we are far less concerned 
with advocating results in particular cases than with advancing the 
broader objective of encouraging courts to articulate their reason­
ing in linkage cases. Given the primitive - indeed, virtually non­
existent - state of the law of linkage, what is desperately needed at 
this juncture are judicial opinions that address linkage issues with 
reasoned explications that recognize and deal with the difficulties 
these cases present. It is our hope that this article will help spur 
such efforts by the courts, for they alone can bring more rationality 
and stability to this much-unsettled area of the law. 
